Unit 1: Wealth, Poverty and Welfare

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The general theme of this Chapter is the relationship between social inequality defined and measured in terms of concepts like wealth, poverty and welfare. The main focus of the Chapter, therefore, is an examination and understanding of the way in which things like wealth, income and poverty are unequally distributed in our society.

As with most areas of the course we can begin to explore this theme by thinking about some initial definitions of significant concepts – in this instance those of income, wealth and poverty – since as Levitas (1999) perceptively argues: “...definition precedes decisions about measurement”. In other words, before we can decide how we’re going to measure something (like poverty for example) we have to decide how it can be defined for at least two reasons:

1. If we can’t define something then it will not be possible to measure it (since we’d have no clear idea about what we’re supposed to be measuring).

2. How we define something has a significant effect on how we measure it. Poverty, as we’ll examine in a moment, can be defined in a range of different ways, each definition producing a different measurement of the nature and extent of poverty in our society.

Definitions, therefore, are important – not least because if we’re going to suggest ways of measuring concepts like income, wealth and poverty it would be helpful to have some idea about what it is we’re trying to measure.

### Income: Observations

**Income**, on the face of things, is not particularly hard to define; it refers to the monies received by an individual over a specified time period (usually, but not necessarily, a year). In this respect, it’s a simple *economic indicator* of value that, consequently, can be objectively quantified (or measured). It can also be one of two types:

1. **Earned** (or *active*) income is money received for doing something (like paid employment).

   The recent “buy-to-let” boom is a good example of “unearned income”. Someone buys a house using a mortgage and they then rent the house to someone else (which, in theory, pays-off the mortgage and leaves a tidy little profit into the bargain - nice “work” if you can afford it...).

2. **Unearned** (or *passive*) income, on the other hand, comes from things like investments (such as dividends from stocks and shares), rents and so forth.

   As Townsend (2004) notes, it’s important not to confuse *earnings* (money from paid work) with *income*; the two ideas, although related, are not the same - income, for example, may include “savings and investments, benefits and occupational pensions, in addition to wages”. Three related ideas we can note here are:

   - **Gross** income involves the total amount of an individual’s income - earned and unearned - before any direct taxation (such as income tax).

   - **Net** (or *disposable*) income is the amount left after various forms of direct taxation have been deducted.

   - **Discretionary** income refers to the amount of money someone has available to spend once essential items (food, clothing, transport to work and shelter for example) have been deducted.

   Although the basic definition of income is fairly straightforward, a couple of complicating factors enter the equation (you just knew they would, didn’t you?) when we think about the possibility of using it as an indicator (or measure) of something like social inequality or poverty:
Individual or Household: Although incomes are earned individually, within family groups or households they’re likely to be pooled (or aggregated), a situation further complicated by the number of incomes being pooled (a single adult contributing to the economic upkeep of the family or a number of adults contributing their income, for example). When income is defined at the level of a family or household, the term:

Equivalised income is frequently used, especially if we want to compare families and households on the basis of their needs; a single adult household, for example, needs a lower income than a two adult with children household to maintain a similar standard of living. Most official statistics in this area use an “equivalence scale”, such as that devised by McClements (1977), to compare incomes between different households.

In this respect we can note that one of the key variables affecting families with low incomes is likely to be the absence of full-time employment (because of retirement, in the case of pensioners, or childcare responsibilities in the case of single-parents).

National, International or Global: When making comparisons between different countries, national income figures are a useful starting-point. Global comparisons, for example, can be used to locate a country’s total income within a world context, whereas international comparisons can be used to compare the total income of a country like Britain with its equivalent economic competitors (such as France or Germany). However, a simple comparative focus on national income levels - while undoubtedly interesting and useful - may mean we overlook wide disparities of income within a society.

Although defining income, as we’ve seen, is not too difficult, such a definition - although necessary - is not particularly useful or meaningful. What would be useful and meaningful is the ability to think about income in terms of its:

Relative distribution in our society. That is, how different levels of income are distributed within and between different social groups. If we can discover this it will go some way towards helping us understand concepts such as poverty and, of course, why some individuals and groups are more unequal than others.

To make income meaningful, therefore, we need to measure it - and this, as we’re about to discover, is not as simple and straightforward as you might expect, for a couple of reasons:
Some groups in society have the ability to hide their real income from the prying eyes of tax officers (and sociologists of course - although they’re probably slightly more concerned about the activities of the former).

The wealthy, for example, may employ accountants to find (legal) ways of minimising their income for tax purposes. Sikka (2003), for example, estimates UK tax avoidance schemes (legal ways of avoiding taxation) cost the government £25 billion each year. On the other hand, some groups may minimise their declared income by working in the:

Income here is either from illegal sources (such as theft or drug-dealing) or paid “cash-in-hand” (that is, paid directly to someone - such as an employee or contractor - without the money being declared for tax purposes).

Measuring something like the “hidden economy” does, therefore, present its own special problems One such problem, as Harrison (2008) notes, being that “There are no official statistics on the size of the black economy or “hidden economy”, as Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs prefers to call it. (A Liberal Democrat MP once objected to the term "black economy", claiming it was “racist”.) But economists have estimated that it accounts for 10 per cent of GDP, or more than £130 billion - and growing”. If, therefore, the hidden economy consists of a wide range of different behaviours (from the proceeds of international drug-trafficking through small-scale tax evasion to something like “moonlighting” — having a second job on which income tax and national insurance are not paid) how is it possible to accurately measure it?

One method, suggested by Pissarides and Weber (1989) is to compare the spending patterns of people with different levels of declared income. They found, for example, that “most self-employed people who declared average earnings of £35,000 had similar spending patterns to employees who earned £50,000” (for the latter taxes are deducted by the employer and so there is no scope for tax evasion by the employee). This suggests, of course, that the self-employed are not declaring substantial amounts of income to the tax authorities (Pissarides and Weber suggest that “on average true self-employment income is 1.5 times as much as reported self- employment income”).

On this basis Bhattacharyya (1999) argues the existence of “unrecorded economic activities” casts doubt on national income estimates and, by so doing, has implications for social and welfare policies (which we’ll discuss in more detail later).

Leaving these complicating factors aside, measuring “net disposable household income” involves, according to Lunn (2003), counting, where applicable, all of the following:

- Net employment earnings.
- Profit or loss from self-employment.
- Social Security benefits and tax credits.
- Occupational and private pensions.
- Investments and savings.
- Maintenance payments (if received directly).
- Educational grants and scholarships (including loans).
- Payments in kind (such as luncheon vouchers or free school meals).

Although defining and measuring income can, as we’ve suggested, be difficult, once we’ve done these things it becomes fascinating (okay, we’re exaggerating a little - it’s not that fascinating, but it can be interesting) to think about how income is distributed unequally in our society across a range of social categories, beginning with:
Although there’s no great surprise in the observation class differences in income exist (in general, the higher your social class, the higher your overall income), a couple of points can be noted:

Proportion: According to the Shephard (2004), income in our society is disproportionately skewed towards the higher social classes, as the following table illustrates:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Richest 1%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richest 10%</td>
<td>28</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poorest 10%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Increasing income inequality: Over the past 40 years, higher income groups have increasingly taken a higher share of national income. The rise in income inequality is not, however, an even upward movement. As Hills (1998), for example, notes:

- The number of people on low incomes is still lower than it was during the early 1990s but much greater than in the early 1980s.
- In 2005/06, almost 13 million people in the UK were living in households below this low income threshold. This is around a fifth (22%) of the population.
- The proportion of people living in relative low income in the UK is twice that of the Netherlands, and one-and-half times that of both France and Germany.

Mathieu (2007), on the other hand, notes that although “The income gap between rich and poor goes on getting bigger, we seem remarkably unconcerned”. As she argues “Income inequality is at a historic high in Britain, but...the public is becoming pessimistic about the possibility of changing this...a report last month on British attitudes to inequality...found that although a large and enduring majority of people think the income gap between rich and poor is too large, there is little understanding about the extent of inequality in Britain and a poor grasp of how wide the gap has become in recent years”.

The Institute of Fiscal Studies (2000) suggests that, although “the widely charted rise in income inequality in the 1980s was checked during the recession of the early 1990’s...inequality has since begun increasing again”. The Office for National Statistics (2004) notes that by 2003 “income distribution was broadly stable” with 20% rises in disposable income (money available to spend after income taxes have been deducted) for both the top and bottom 10% of the income ladder. Somewhat perversely, of course, a similar percentage rise for those on high and low incomes means that income inequality between these two groups increases (for the deceptively simple reason that 20% of a lot of money is better than 20% of a little money...).
Thinking about these ideas, we can identify a number of reasons for income inequality in the recent past:

**Structural economic changes over the past 25 years**

**Technological changes:** The development and application of computer technology over the past 25 years has had a number of consequences for income inequality in our society, related to the changing nature of employment. In the 1980’s, for example, the decline in manufacturing (such as car production) and extraction industries (such as coal mining) led to an increase in (mainly working class) unemployment.

The rise in service industries (such as banking and finance services, data processing and so forth), has, on the other hand, had a couple of consequences we can note here. Firstly, the growth of relatively low-paid work in areas such as call centres and, secondly, an increase in the income of some parts of the middle class as employers pay an income premium for skills, knowledge and qualifications.

**Trade Unions:** The decline in the number of people joining unions has lessened their ability to raise wage levels for the poorest sections of our society.

**Unemployment:** Although at around 1.5 million people this is far lower than in the early 1980’s (where an estimated 3 - 4 million people were unemployed), substantial numbers of individuals and, more importantly, households, who rely for their income on State benefits are among the poorest in our society.

**Benefit changes:** Payments were once linked to rises in income, but are now linked to price rises. In a low price-inflation economy (where prices rise slowly, if at all), the value of welfare benefits has declined in relation to work-related incomes.

**Tax changes:** The highest rate of income tax is now 40% (for those earning over £40,000), which contrasts with rates reaching 80% - 90% in the recent past. Those on higher incomes, therefore, now get to keep more of that income.

In addition, there are a couple of useful concepts we can apply in this context (and, as we will see, in relation to areas such as gender, age and ethnicity): **Vertical segregation** refers to the way the workplace is hierarchically structured (“top to bottom”); within occupations, for example, there is normally a grading structure whereby those at the top earn significantly more than those at the bottom (a Head teacher for example, earns more than a classroom teacher).

**Horizontal segregation** refers to the idea different occupations have significantly different rates of pay. Middle class occupations (such as a doctor or lawyer) are segregated from working class occupations (such as bricklayer or road sweeper) on the basis of skills, knowledge and qualifications.

Income differences, for a variety of reasons, are linked to age in two main ways:

**Individually:** In general, the incomes of the young are lower than those of other age groups (with the possible exception of those aged 65+). One explanation here is that of career seniority linked to levels of skills, knowledge and qualifications. Vertical workplace segregation, for example, may be a factor in aged-related income inequalities in some occupations (such as Further Education lecturing, where individuals move up the pay scale for each year of experience they gain).

**Life cycle:** Rownlinson et al (1999) argue significant income inequalities are related to life cycle differences. Thus, “young, childless, couples” for example, generally have higher (household) incomes than young single people or young couples with children. For couples with children,
Rownlinson et al noted three significant factors in relation to income:

- **Single parents** had significantly lower incomes than dual parent households.
- **Age of children**: Lower income families were more likely to have children of pre-school age.
- **Age of mother**: Where women delayed childbearing (until their early 30’s, for example), this had less impact on family income levels. This is probably due to middle class women, in particular, delaying childbearing until they have established a career to which they can return after child birth.

Rigg and Sefton (2004) also point to the way life cycle factors affect income when they note: “Mothers typically reduce their employment activity when they have children and retirement is usually, though not always, associated with a reduction in employment activity”.

One interesting feature of the elderly and retirement is the observation that, although this group tend to have significantly lower incomes (especially single elderly people) they’re often one of the wealthiest social groups (mainly because of outright house ownership and the value of private pensions).

Average female incomes have, historically, been lower than average male incomes. The Office for National Statistics (2004) noted, for example, the “gender gap in average hourly pay of full-time employees” was 18% (women earn 82% of average male earnings) - a decline, it should be noted, from 26% in 1986. By 2006, however, Self and Zealey (2007) note that the gap had reduced further to around 13%

Although this figure hides significant differences in income across different social classes and occupations, we can note a number of reasons for the continuing difference:

**Discrimination**: Although an old favourite, we shouldn’t discount the continued significance of overt (and covert) forms of sex discrimination within the workplace as an explanation for gendered income inequality.

**Vertical segregation**: Within many occupations, the top (highest-paid) positions are still predominantly filled by men. The concept of a glass ceiling is sometimes used to suggest the idea that, although women may not suffer overt forms of sex discrimination, they are still, by-and-large, unable to reach the top positions in companies in any great number.

**Horizontal segregation** refers to the idea many occupations are sex segregated, in the sense of being predominantly performed by either males or females. Female-dominated occupations, for example, include areas such as teaching, nursing, shop and secretarial work and, in general, these types of work are lower paid than male-dominated occupations.

**Dual Labour markets**: Sociologists often distinguish between:

- **Primary** labour markets, involving, for example, large, technologically advanced, companies with high levels of profitability, job security, promotion, career prospects and wages and
- **Secondary** labour markets where the reverse is true - working conditions, job security and wage levels, for example, are normally considerably worse than in the primary market.

The fact women tend to work in the secondary labour market, therefore, goes some way to explaining lower levels of female income. Sommerlad and Sanderson (1997), for example, note: “The primary market is conceptualised as male and characterised by male ways of working and career norms”.

**Gender**

Even where women are present in a primary market (as in the case of solicitors studied by Sommerlad and Sanderson), they occupy a secondary position, based on the idea of vertical workplace segregation. In other words, women in such professions generally have lower incomes than their male counterparts.

Furthermore, Sommerlad and Sanderson argue the position of women within an organisation may be both fragmented and complicated, thus: “The secondary market is characterised by its own hierarchy: full-time women who have not taken a career break and who are childless, but who have not been accepted as ‘honorary men’, full-time women who have not taken a break, but who have dependent children, returners with children who are full-time and, at the bottom, returners with children, who work part-time”.

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**Do women have to be accepted as “honorary men” within the workplace to achieve income equality?**
In relation to non-white ethnic groups we find a diversity of income levels related to specific cultural (such as family composition, size and type) and economic factors (such as type and level of employment). In an overall sense, factors such as those identified for other social groups also apply to ethnic minorities. For example:

**Racial discrimination** is a factor in the relatively lower levels of income experienced by minority groups compared to their majority (white) counterparts.

**Vertical segregation** involves the fact ethnic minority group members (with notable exceptions - especially among those who have successfully established their own businesses) tend to be employed at lower organisational levels.

**Horizontal segregation** operates by locating minority group workers in lower-paid occupations (such as nursing, for example).

**Dual Labour markets**: Ethnic minority groups are disproportionately found in secondary markets, where they experience lower job security and wages.

Against this general background of lower ethnic group incomes, Berthoud (1998) notes a wide diversity of income levels between different non-white groups. He identifies Pakistanis and Bangladeshis as being amongst the very poorest in our society for a number of reasons:

- **Family size** tends to be larger than average.
- **Unemployment** is high among males.
- **Economic activity** is low amongst females.
- **Lower levels** of pay.

Finally we can note that in terms of the risk of experiencing income levels significantly below the national average, Self and Zealey (2007) point to the following factors as being most significant:

1. **Economic status** of adults in the family: Those at greatest risk in our society involve families with no adult member working.
2. **Ethnic group** of head of household: Asian and Black African ethnicities, for example, are most likely to experience low incomes.
3. **Family type**: Single parent families are the third largest group in the low income structure.
4. **Disability**: Families with disabled children or adults are at significant risk (very slightly greater than for single parents) of experiencing low incomes.

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**FUELing ethnic inequality?**

1. **Family size**
2. **Unemployment**
3. **Economic activity**
4. **Lower pay**
Wealth, Poverty and Welfare

Defining income is, you’ll no-doubt be happy to know, relatively straightforward compared to defining wealth.

Although Matheson and Summerfield (2001) make a relatively simple distinction:

- **Income** represents a flow of resources over a period, received either in cash or in kind.

- **Wealth** describes the ownership of assets valued at a particular point in time.

the main (sociological) problem we have in relation to defining wealth is deciding the relative importance of different types of:

**Asset**, defined as the ownership of things (such as cars, houses and computers) that have an economic value - they can be sold for money, in other words. However, within this basic category there are two sub-divisions we can note:

1. **Use**: If we think about economic assets in terms of property, this category involves the things we own for personal use; the home in which we live, the car we drive, the sociology books we read. The significance of ownership here is that, because it involves personal need or use, if we sell something we need, we may have to buy something similar to replace it. This dimension of wealth is clearly important when we’re comparing cross-cultural wealth (and poverty), but less useful when we’re comparing levels of wealth within a society. Part of the reason for this is a debate about whether or not the things we own for their use value (I need a house in which to live, a car to get me to work and sociology books to teach from) can be counted as wealth in the same way as things kept for their:

2. **Value**: Property in this category refers to the things we own as investments - the things we accumulate for their worth and the value they will realise once sold. Stocks and shares are obvious examples here, but ownership of a second home also counts as wealth in this category. This is often called marketable wealth. However, just to complicate matters, a further dimension here is:

- **Non-marketable wealth** - this has neither a particular use, nor can it be sold. A personal pension is a classic example of this type of wealth.

In terms of the above, therefore, we can distinguish between two types of wealth:

1. **Productive property** is a form of wealth that can create income (by selling something like a second home, ownership of a business, investments in things like shares and so forth).

2. **Consumption property**, on the other hand, involves things owned for their use (such as a TV set). They don’t create income, but they could be sold. However, they would have to be replaced if you wanted to maintain a certain standard of living.

Debates about how to define wealth are important since, as Jenkins (1990) argues, if we can’t easily decide how wealth should be defined and measured, this creates problems for our understanding of its distribution in society (understanding, in effect, who owns what and the social consequences of different levels of wealth ownership).

Such debates are important, however, because they shape our understanding of ideas like social inequality and poverty; if we include in our definition of wealth everything people own, the picture we get is one in which disparities of wealth (the difference between the wealthiest and poorest in our society) may not be as great as if we exclude from our definition those things owned for their use, rather than their actual value.

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**Tried and Tested**

(a) Explain the difference between earnings and income (4 marks).

(b) Suggest two reasons why it might be difficult to measure the extent of the “hidden economy” (4 marks).

(c) Explain how workplace segregation may explain income differences based on one of the following: class, age, gender or ethnicity (4 marks).

(d) Examine some possible reasons for income inequality in the UK over the past 25 years (24 marks).

(e) Assess explanations for income inequalities based around concepts of class, age, gender and ethnicity (24 marks).

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- **Wealth** describes the ownership of assets valued at a particular point in time.

**Wealth: Observations**

- **Income** represents a flow of resources over a period, received either in cash or in kind.

- **Wealth** describes the ownership of assets valued at a particular point in time.

**Jimi’s Burger Bar and Grill**

- productive property by day and consumption property at the weekend BarBQ...
When we think about how wealth is distributed between social groups in our society we need to keep three things in mind:

1. **Definitions**: As we’ve just seen, how you define wealth has implications for how we understand its distribution in our society (if we exclude, for example, home ownership from our definition the picture we get will be of a more unequal society in terms of wealth than if we include it).

2. **Measurement**: In this instance we’re less concerned with what counts as wealth and more with how to reliably and validly count people’s actual wealth. This is not always easy, for similar reasons to the measurement of income:

   - **Masking**: The wealthy, for personal and tax reasons, can restrict our ability to estimate their wealth accurately. This may involve moving wealth “off-shore” (to countries with relatively lax tax and disclosure laws) or gifting money and property to relatives to avoid inheritance taxes - and since much of our knowledge about the wealth of the very rich is only revealed when they die (from their wills), we need to be aware this type of source may underestimate the extent of individual wealth.

   - **Hidden economy**: This may involve both wealth accumulated by criminal means or, as in the above, exploiting various legal loopholes to hide actual levels of real wealth from tax authorities.

3. **Process**: Rowlinson et al (1999) identified four major factors in the ability to accumulate wealth (not including, of course, the ability to inherit it from your parents):

   - **High income**: The highest income groups are more likely to use part of their income for investment (savings, stocks and shares, etc.). Townsend (2004), for example, noted “…almost 70% of investment income is received by those with incomes above £20,000 a year”.

   - **Lifestyle** - which included attitudes towards saving (and, most importantly, the ability to save).

   - **Knowledge** relating to investment schemes and opportunities was a significant factor in wealth accumulation.

   - **Availability** of suitable savings and investment schemes.

Keeping these ideas in mind, we can make some general statements about the distribution of wealth in our society:

There is a strong relationship between social class and wealth. In terms of its general distribution, for example, the Office for National Statistics (2003) provides the following breakdown:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Marketable Wealth</th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top 1%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top 10%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top 25%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom 50%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Self and Zealey (2007), on the other hand, note the following levels of wealth distribution:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Most wealthy 1%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most wealthy 25%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most wealthy 50%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>93%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Least wealthy 50%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When we look at **total marketable wealth** (which includes the value of houses), therefore, the picture we get is one of:

- **Inequality**: The wealthiest half of the population, for example, currently holds 93% of the nation’s total wealth.

Both tables reveal a quite phenomenal picture of wealth inequality in the contemporary UK - with the “most wealthy 1%” of the population (roughly 60,000 individuals) owning three times as much wealth as the “least wealthy 50%” - roughly **30 million** people.

- **Increasing inequality**: Over the past 25 years, the wealthy have taken a greater share of the nation’s wealth.

**Module Link**  **Stratification and Differentiation**

Inequalities relating to areas like wealth and income are significant aspects of and contributors towards general social inequalities in the contemporary UK.

Large differences in the ownership of wealth are significant factors in both social inequalities (how people are included and excluded from the “normal expectations of life” in our society) and social stratification – the wealthy, for example, are increasingly able – and willing - to set themselves physically apart from the rest of society.
If we exclude the value of dwellings (because a house, for the vast majority of the population has only use value - although it can be sold for profit, the seller needs to buy another house because they need somewhere to live...) the picture is, as might be expected, one of even greater inequality.

According to the Office for National Statistics (2004), one-third of all wealth is owned - as the following table illustrates - by just 1% of the population:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marketable wealth (less value of dwellings)</th>
<th>1976</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2001</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top 1%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top 10%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top 25%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom 50%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This situation has led Townsend (2004) to argue for the significance of:

Wealth exclusion: The number of people with the least wealth (those with no savings or investments) increased in the 20th century. 10% of the UK population had no discernable material wealth at the end of the century (a figure that rises to 20% in the 20 - 34 age group).

A significant factor in the relationship between social class and wealth is:

Inheritance: Not only can wealthy individuals’ marketable wealth be passed, on death, to their offspring, the value of any non-marketable wealth may also be realised at this point. One consequence of this system is:

Elite self-recruitment: The wealthy - by their ability to pass their wealth down the family line to their offspring perpetuate wealth inequalities, effectively ensuring the recruitment of their sons - and, increasingly, daughters - to the ranks of the wealthy.

The existence of “death duty” taxation also helps explain what little wealth redistribution there has been over the past 50 years in the UK; the very wealthy seek to minimise their tax liabilities by passing wealth down the family line before they die. Although, historically, inheritance has been through the male line (patrilineal descent), the increasing likelihood of all children being included may slightly dilute the overall wealth of the very wealthiest in the population by spreading wealth across a number of different children.

If we think about age-related wealth in terms of an individual’s life cycle, over their lifetime people are more likely to build-up marketable wealth, which suggests wealth inequality is built into our economic system.

Rowlinson et al (1999) noted how wealth increased with age, peaking in the 60 - 69 age group. The least wealthy life cycle groups were “young single people (under the age of 35) and lone parents”.

Although, as we’ve noted, in the past wealth was generally passed down the male line, this practice is not as prevalent as it once was. However, in terms of wealth creation, men are much more likely to feature among the self-made wealthy than women (something related to economic practices and opportunities - we could think about how vertical and horizontal workplace segregation apply here).

Among non-white ethnic groups, those of Asian origin (especially Pakistani origins) are most likely to feature in the least wealthy 10% of the UK population. Those of Chinese origin, on the other hand, are most likely - among all ethnic minority groups - to appear in the wealthiest 10% of the population.

Green (1994) noted changes in the traditional distribution of wealth in the UK during the 1980’s - areas formerly dependent on large-scale extraction industries (such as coal-mining) and manufacturing saw a general decline in their share of the nation’s wealth; the South-East and London (where the commercial focus is on service industries) saw their proportionate share of wealth increase. This process has continued into the 21st century.

(a) Explain the difference between income and wealth (4 marks).

(b) Suggest two reasons why it might be difficult to measure wealth (4 marks).

(c) Suggest two reasons why wealth may be a better indicator of inequality than income (4 marks).

(d) Examine some possible reasons for wealth inequality in the UK over the past 25 years (24 marks).

(e) Assess explanations for wealth inequalities based around concepts of class, age, gender and ethnicity (24 marks).
Poverty: Observations

Although you won’t thank us for this, it’s probably fair to warn you that our ability to define poverty presents us with some subtly different problems compared to our ability to define concepts such as wealth and income.

The good news is there are two basic types of definition we can use (we’ll leave the bad news about them until you’ve understood what’s involved):

1. Absolute

This definition of poverty is based on the idea we can identify the minimum conditions for the maintenance of human life. Gordon and Townsend et al’s study (2003), for example, was one of the first (1901) to identify a minimum subsistence level, below which people were to be considered poor. He also distinguished between what he called:

Primary poverty - a situation in which individuals or families lacked the means to provide the basic necessities of life (food, clothing and shelter, for example) and

Secondary poverty - a situation in which, although people have sufficient means to sustain life, they fail to do so adequately because they spend at least part of their income on things that aren’t essential (a classic example here might be spending on things like alcohol and tobacco).

In this respect, we can think of this type of definition as being based on human biological needs. A more modern version of absolute poverty, however, might be evidenced by Rowntree (of the Foundation and Fruit Gums fame) for example, who was one of the first (1901) to identify a minimum subsistence level, below which people were to be considered poor. He also distinguished between what he called:


1. Clean water
2. Sanitation
3. Shelter
4. Education
5. Information
6. Food
7. Health

**Minimum Needs**: Although human life has certain minimum needs (a given amount of food and water each day, for example), this type of “absolute definition” is not particularly useful when it’s applied to societies (such as Britain in the 21st century) where very few - if any - people are unable to meet these “minimum needs”.

Gordon and Townsend et al, for example, found 35% of children in the Middle East & North Africa were in absolute poverty - applying the same measures in their study to children in Britain would probably conclude no - or very little - poverty existed in our society. Although in absolute terms this may be true, it’s not a very useful way to think about poverty, mainly because there are considerable differences in general living standards in our society - some people, in basic terms, have more of the “good things in life” than others - and we need to understand the significance of this type of difference. For this reason, an alternative way of measuring poverty focuses on:

2. Relative

If, at least in its original formulation, the concept of absolute poverty focused on the idea of biological needs, the concept of relative poverty - originally articulated through the work of Townsend (1954) and Townsend and Abel-Smith (1965) - added the idea of:

Cultural needs to the definition. In other words, Townsend (amongst others) argued poverty in affluent (wealthy) societies wasn’t simply a matter of biology - someone should be considered poor if they lacked the resources to participate fully in the social and cultural life of the society in which they lived.

This type of definition introduced the idea poverty was related in some way to the “normal and acceptable” standard of living in any society (whatever this may be).

Mack and Lansley (1984) express this idea quite neatly when they note: “Poverty can be seen in terms of an enforced lack of socially perceived necessities”. The key idea here is “socially perceived”; what one society at one particular time sees as being “unnecessary” may, in another society or at another time, be seen as essential. By considering poverty in terms of cultural needs, therefore, we can accommodate ideas of:

Cross-cultural differences: Different societies, for example, have different living standards - life in East Africa, for example, is not the same as life in East Anglia.

Historical differences: In our society, life is very different for the majority of the population today to what it was 200 years ago. What may have been considered an acceptable living standard at the start of the 19th century would probably not be considered acceptable today.

However we specifically define absolute forms of poverty, this type of general definition rests on the ability to draw a:

Poverty line by which to identify basic human requirements (in the manner of Gordon and Townsend et al’s study). In basic terms, if you do not have these things, you are poor.

As we will see in a moment, there are advantages and disadvantages to defining and measuring poverty in absolute terms. However, we need to note a significant problem (one that led to the idea of defining poverty in relative terms - something that’s discussed further below) with absolute definitions, namely the concept of:
Demographic differences takes the idea of cultural relativity further by noting that, even within the same society, there are differences between social groups (such as young people and the elderly). A “normal and acceptable” living standard for a teenager may not necessarily be viewed in the same way by an old age pensioner.

In later Sections of this Chapter we’re going to look at the concept of poverty in more detail, so we’re not going to think about things like the extent of poverty in our society just yet. Instead, we can look a little more closely at how poverty is defined and measured and the respective advantages and disadvantages of such definitions and measurements.

We can begin by noting poverty (unlike concepts such as income and wealth) is not something we can directly measure, since it’s not immediately quantifiable. To operationalise (define and measure) the concept we need to identify certain indicators of poverty (in the way you’ve just done in the previous activity, for example).

In this respect, all definitions of poverty (either absolute or relative) are essentially based on the same idea, namely we can - somewhere and somehow - draw a poverty line, below which people are to be considered poor and above which they are to be considered not poor. The argument, therefore, is not particularly over whether absolute or relative definitions are superior or inferior (since both types, ultimately contain an absolute definition somewhere along the line). Rather, the argument over definitions falls in two main categories:

1. **Indicators**: The main question here is whether we use biological or cultural indicators (or perhaps both) as the basis for any definition: Absolute definitions are more likely to use the former (because they provide a basic yardstick against which to measure human needs in general), whereas relative definitions are more likely to use the latter (because they provide a flexible set of indicators that can be applied to specific societies at different times).

2. **Measurement**: Related to the above, we have to decide what features of social life are to be used as indicators of poverty. Relative definitions, for example, use a range of different indicators depending on the preferences of their creators - an idea we can briefly outline in the following way:

**Relative Definitions**

Measuring relative forms of poverty involves varying levels of complexity and depends, to some extent, on what the researcher is trying to achieve and the resources they have available. We can get a flavour for the various ways of defining and measuring poverty by identifying a variety of different models using a basic classification suggested by Ruggeri et al (2003):

**Monetary Models**

These involve using income (either directly or in terms of the ability to buy certain goods and services defined as “necessities”) as the basic definition and measure of poverty. For example:

**Households Below Average Income**: In the UK, this measure sets a relative household poverty line at 60% of median net income (the “median” is found by arranging income values in order and then identifying the one in the middle - if the median income was £100 per week, for example, the poverty line would be drawn at £60 per week).

In the European Community, however, a figure of 50% of median net income is used as a poverty line - which demonstrates how problems of definition may occur even when we use a relatively simple monetary indicator of poverty.

**The World Bank** uses the formula of “1$ a day” (approximately 60p) as the economic measure of world poverty - if your income is above this level you are not classified as poor.
**Basic Necessities Surveys:** Davies (1998) argues poverty can be defined as "the lack of basic necessities". However, what these necessities may be is not pre-defined by the researcher; rather, they are identified during the research process. The researcher may, for example, start with a list of items (such as a television) and events (the right to an education, for example) and these are accepted, rejected or modified by respondents as they see fit. These approaches are similar to the participatory models approach (see below) but are usually classified as consensual approaches to defining poverty because they're based on a popular consensus about what constitutes "basic necessities".

### Capability Models
These approaches focus on what Sen (1999) has termed "indicators of the freedom to live a valued life". In other words, they focus on understanding poverty as a set of lived experiences (things people can or cannot do) rather than a simple monetary approach. What these capabilities may be differs both historically and cross-culturally and involves identifying a range of indicators of deprivation (the ways some people are deprived of the things a society takes-for-granted as being part of a normal and acceptable standard of living). We can, for example, note a couple of capability-based concepts:

- **Relative Deprivation:** Writers such as Townsend (1979) and Mack and Lansley (1985) used a range of indicators of deprivation to measure people's quality of life. Townsend, for example, included things like household amenities (a refrigerator and fixed bath, for example), how often people went out to visit friends or for a meal, as well as the type of food people bought and ate. Townsend's "Material Deprivation Score" analyses (1991 and 2001) for the National Public Health Service for Wales are more recent examples of this approach, using a simplified index of deprivation based on four Census-based variables, namely the percentages of households:
  - With no car
  - Not owner occupied
  - Unemployed
  - Overcrowded

- **Indices of Deprivation:** Although measuring a range of deprivation indicators in a similar way to the ones noted above, involve broader estimates of people's overall quality of life. The McLennan (2004), for example, used indicators such as levels of income, employment and experienced crime (among other factors) to create an index of material deprivation.

The main difference between the two (similar) approaches is their focus: relative deprivation approaches tend to focus on individuals and households, whereas indices of deprivation approaches broaden the scope to include wider community factors (such as levels of crime in an area).

### Social Exclusion
These approaches represent a more recent way of thinking about how poverty and deprivation affect people and the society in which they live. They focus, as you might expect, on trying to measure the various ways people are excluded from participation in the activities and experiences we take for granted as part of our general lifestyle.

A range of indicators can be used to measure social exclusion. For example, "Opportunity for All: Tackling Poverty and Social Exclusion" (Department of Works and Pensions, 2003) identified a variety of ideas (levels of rural poverty, unemployment, urban deprivation, child poverty, health care and so forth) that, taken together, represent some of the ways people are socially excluded.

Palmer et al (2003), on the other hand, used indicators related specifically to different age groups (children, youth, adults and the elderly) as a way of measuring exclusion. Within each group they looked at different factors (such as birth weight and exclusion from school for children, winter death rates, levels of anxiety and access to services for the elderly) to arrive at a comprehensive "index of exclusion".

### Participatory Models
These are similar to consensual approaches in that they're based on the idea of asking people to define what they mean by poverty. However, as Bennett and Roberts (2004) argue, a major difference here is that the meaning of poverty is constructed through "discussions with people with past or present experience of poverty". This approach, they argue, takes control over definitions away from governments and researchers and returns it to the people with direct, first-hand, experience of the matter. A similar:

- **Ethnographic approach** (allowing the poor to "speak for themselves") was advocated by Beresford et al (1999) as a means of understanding, as opposed to simply representing, poverty. The main objective of such approaches, therefore, is to discover ways of eliminating poverty and social exclusion based on how the people involved actually experience such things.

Although these types of approach can be criticised (it's not just the poor, for example, who have an interest in both defining and eliminating poverty), Chambers (1995), defends participatory approaches by asking: "Whose reality counts? The reality of the few in centres of power? Or the reality of the many poor at the periphery?". He justifies such approaches by arguing they have the potential to bring "poor people's problems and priorities" to the attention of national policy makers.
To complete this section we can look briefly at a number of advantages and disadvantages to absolute and relative definitions of poverty.

### Absolute Definitions

If, for the sake of argument, we consider absolute forms of poverty in terms of indicators related to human biological needs we can note a number of advantages to this form of measurement:

**Standardisation:** The basic definition of poverty never changes, since human beings, wherever they live in the world, all have the same basic needs in terms of the things required to sustain life. Thus, when we measure poverty we’re always applying the same set of rules. This makes measurement:

**Objective:** Once we’ve decided what constitutes minimum or essential human needs, our definition - and hence measurement - doesn’t change. Falkingham (2000), for example, notes absolute definitions are based on objective norms; we are always, in other words, applying the same definition of poverty wherever and whenever we try to measure it. This, of course, makes the concept:

**Transferable:** Once we’ve identified norms that define poverty, they can be consistently applied across all societies, which allows us to compare levels of poverty on a global scale, regardless of different levels of social and technological development within different societies.

**Social Change:** Because biological needs don’t change over time, absolute measures allow us to track historical changes to the levels of poverty in the same society.

**Poverty:** This type of definition does exactly what it says on the tin - it measures poverty. It doesn’t try to measure concepts like deprivation, relative deprivation or social inclusion and exclusion. It has the advantage, therefore, of being simple, clear, consistent and easily understandable as a way of measuring poverty.

Having said this, absolute approaches do have several disadvantages, which we can note in the following terms:

**Basic Needs:** Historical and cross-cultural differences in terms of living standards make it difficult to apply a standard “biological needs” test of poverty in any meaningful way. Using a “minimum subsistence level” test in modern Britain, for example, would, as we’ve previously suggested, result in very little (if any) poverty being found.

**Social change:** Related to the above idea, it’s clear that in our society, ideas about what is and what isn’t
an “acceptable standard of living” have changed - even over the course of the past 50 years. As a society changes, therefore, concepts of poverty also need to develop to reflect these changes. Thus, we need to think about:

Poverty itself, in the sense of what it means to us as a society. Some critics of relative measures argue, as we will see, relative definitions measure things like social inequality, deprivation and exclusion rather than poverty. In historical terms, however, it’s clear that as living standards rise people’s expectations about acceptable lifestyles change - and concepts of poverty (however defined) also need to change to reflect the fact we now live in a very different type of society to the one that existed 50 or 100 years ago. If societies and individuals change, should we keep to definitions of poverty that belong to a world that has disappeared?

Objectivity: There are two points we can usefully make here. Firstly, any attempt to draw a poverty line - even one as basic as “minimum nutritional needs” - cannot be truly objective. This follows because the concept of poverty itself is a subjective condition; if you think about it, my definition of “minimum needs” may be different to your definition - and we have no objective way of choosing between them.

Related to this idea is the fact there is no such thing as a minimum level of human need. A child, for example, will have different minimum needs to an adult and an adult male manual worker will have different minimum needs to an adult male office worker. As these examples, demonstrate, even apparently objective definitions of poverty may have a cultural (subjective) basis.

Secondly, simply because we may prefer quantifiable - as opposed to qualitative - ways of defining and measuring poverty, doesn’t make the former any better - or indeed worse - than the latter. Ultimately, concepts of poverty reflect whatever a society and its members believe is an acceptable standard of living - which leads to the idea of:

Relative differentiation: Although, on the face of things, identifying needs doesn’t appear to be a problem, a couple of questions arise. Firstly, as Falkingham (2000) notes, what exactly are people’s “needs” (are they merely biological or do they extend into cultural areas such as education)?; secondly, on what level do we measure need?

For example, do we measure it in terms of individuals, families or households, or do we extend this to include communities? Alternatively, as we’ve just suggested, an elderly adult has different needs to a child or a pregnant woman. In this respect, it’s not simply a matter of defining a set of “human needs” and applying them uncritically to a population that is relatively differentiated (that is, a population with different biological and cultural needs).

Office for National Statistics (2004): Do rising living standards in our society make absolute definitions a less valid way of measuring poverty?

These definitions of poverty, on the other hand, have a number of advantages, leading from - and reflecting to some extent - the criticisms we’ve made of absolute definitions:

Realism: Relative definitions - even the simplest ones that focus on income or budgetary requirements - more realistically reflect the nature of modern lifestyles; life in our society is, arguably, more than just the pursuit of a minimum standard of living. This follows because of:

Social differentiation: As we’ve suggested, although we’re all human this doesn’t make us the same; on the contrary, people are different in a number of (socially constructed) ways. If such differences - even if we minimally consider them in terms of class, age, gender, ethnicity and region - are real, it follows any definition of poverty must attempt to reflect and capture the richness of people’s social behaviour - an idea that leads us to:

Measuring “needs” - do the elderly have different needs to the young?
Complexity: If our society is a complex place, considered in terms of culture and lifestyle for example, any concept of poverty - expressed perhaps in terms of relative forms of deprivation and social exclusion - must, of necessity, be complex. Relative definitions, because they attempt to measure a variety of different dimensions of life and lifestyle, are more likely than absolute definitions to accurately represent people’s behaviour, attitudes and expectations.

In addition, therefore, we need to be aware poverty is not simply about being economically poor - it must also be considered in terms of things like access to education and health, general life chances, risk of illness and so forth.

Although relative definitions have significant advantages, in terms of how they conceive, theorise and attempt to measure poverty, the range of different measures and perspectives involved make for some significant disadvantages we can outline as follows:

Meaning: Maxwell (1999) notes how, over the years, the meaning of “poverty” has evolved - not just in terms of ideas like deprivation and exclusion, but also in terms of more specific ideas about what is actually being measured. He notes, for example, seven different basic meanings in current use:

- Income or consumption poverty.
- Human (under)development.
- Ill-being.
- (Lacking) capability and functioning.
- Vulnerability.
- Livelihood unsustainability.
- Lack of basic needs.

Such diversity of meaning makes it difficult to know what, if anything, is being measured using different types of relative definition. In addition, the question arises about who decides the meaning of poverty? What happens, for example, when someone can be objectively defined as “poor” but they refuse to consider themselves poor? This raises the problem of:

Subjectivity: Although, to some extent, true of all ways of defining and measuring poverty, relative definitions and measurements raise a number of significant problems. For example:

- **Objective measurements** used as indicators of relative poverty (such as in income or budget approaches), raise the question of who decides where a poverty line is drawn is somewhat arbitrary (as we’ve seen in relation to the difference between UK and European Community income-based definitions).

- **Consensual definitions** have similar problems - people may lack knowledge and experience of poverty when they’re asked to decide what features of social life represent “normal” and “acceptable” aspects of our general standard of living.

**Disadvantages**:

- Ethnographic (Participatory) definitions involve the basic problem that, in order to involve “the poor” in the creation of definitions of poverty you have to categorise people as poor in the first place (which sort of limits the effectiveness of such studies).

Differentiation: In the same way that a differentiated population creates problems for absolute definitions, the same is also true for relative definitions unless they are sufficiently clearly defined to reflect possible differences in population expectations and standards. This means that:

- **Indicators of poverty** cannot be easily standardised. Cross-culturally and historically there will be different living standards that need to be reflected in the indicators used.

Poverty: A major criticism of relative definitions is that they lose sight of poverty, as such, and instead become measures of social inequality. In an affluent society people can enjoy a relatively comfortable standard of living - yet still be classed as “relatively poor”. The problem, in this respect, is that poverty becomes a function of definition rather than fact; that is, in every society where social inequality exists - no matter what the general standard of living in that society - relative poverty will always, by definition, exist.

Tried and Tested

(a) Explain the difference between absolute and relative poverty (2 marks).

(b) Suggest two reasons why it might be difficult to measure poverty (4 marks).

(c) Identify and explain two problems with the use of either absolute or relative definitions of poverty (6 marks).

(d) Examine some possible advantages and disadvantages of relative definitions and measurements of poverty (24 marks).

(e) Assess the advantages and disadvantages of absolute measurements of poverty (24 marks).

Beresford, Peter; Green, David; Lister, Ruth and Woodard, Kirsty (1999) “Poverty First Hand: Poor people speak for themselves”: Child Poverty Action Group.


Harrison, David (2008) “Middle-class criminals cost millions in taxes”:


Mathieu, Marika (2007) “Britain: our divided nation”: New Statesman, 9th August


http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=1006


Startup, Tom (20002) “Poor Measures”: Social Market Foundation.


This section focuses on the concept of social inequality - considered in terms of the ideas introduced in the first section of this chapter - and it involves outlining and examining a range of different explanations for the distribution of poverty, wealth and income between different social groups. In this respect we can consider a number of different perspectives on equality, firstly by outlining their key theoretical points and, subsequently, by applying these ideas to a specific explanation of inequality.

Thinking about social inequality from a Functionalist viewpoint, we can identify a number of key ideas that inform this general perspective, the first of which, unsurprisingly, is that of:

**Function**: We know that if something exists in society it does so because it performs some important task or function. The question here, therefore, is what are the functions of inequality based around disparities in wealth and income – a question that, on the face of things, may appear a little nonsensical since we usually assume that something like poverty is both undesirable and in need of eradication. If something (such as poverty) has a purpose then from this particular perspective it is built into the very structure or fabric of the society in which it exists; it is, not to put too fine a point on things, essential for the existence of that society.

To understand why inequality is **functional**, therefore, we need to understand a little more about how Functionalist perspectives understand “society”. In this respect, we can note modern societies are seen as:

**Complex systems**: That is, they involve a huge range of political, economic and social roles that have to be successfully filled and performed. For example, focusing on economic roles, you’ll be aware of a vast number of roles (or “jobs” as some people call them) that need to be done; to take a few at random, we need doctors, police officers, traffic wardens, dentists, people to empty our dustbins, shelf-stackers, lifeguards and, last but by no means least, burger-flippers in McDonald’s. In this respect, the working world is:

**Differentiated** in terms of roles requiring different levels of skill, training, expertise and knowledge. If this is the case, societies have to find ways of allowing people to demonstrate they have the skills necessary to perform certain jobs - if work roles were simply allocated randomly, or on the basis of “who you know” we’d have a situation in which anyone who fancied being a dentist could set themselves up as such. I don’t know about you, but personally if someone’s going to put a drill in my mouth I’d prefer it to be someone trained in dentistry, rather than “the bloke who used to be a garage mechanic”. For Functionals, the best way to allocate work roles is through the “proven merits” of each individual - hence it’s important society is:

**Meritocratic**: That is, people are required to demonstrate their abilities (by working hard in school, for example - there’s probably a moral there somewhere) in order to qualify themselves for certain roles. Although Davis and Moore (1945) have argued some roles are more “functionally-necessary” than others - therefore, we have to ensure the “best people” fill them by giving them incentives and rewards (such as higher pay) - this isn’t necessarily the case. Even if we leave aside the idea all roles are functionally necessary in some way - if they weren’t they wouldn’t exist - on what basis can we say the woman who sweeps my street is less functionally important than a bank manager?

In a meritocracy people succeed or fail on the basis of their individual merits...

If society is **meritocratic** (and it’s not necessarily true that it is - but bear with us for the moment), it must therefore be based on:
Competition, which develops in a society for the performance of particular roles; some are more desirable, fulfilling and, of course well-paid (which is a bit of a chicken-and-egg situation - do people compete for high-paid jobs because they are well-paid, or do they pay well because there’s a lot of competition for them?) than others. Stacking shelves in Sainsbury’s is something most people could do after about 5 minutes training; learning how to carry out a heart transplant probably takes a little longer. Economic inequality, therefore, develops “naturally” out of the:

Social division of labour: As work is differentiated in terms of, for example, skills, qualifications and income levels, societies develop hierarchically (in the sense some jobs come to be seen as better than others).

Thus, for traditional Functionalism, economic inequality is both functional and necessary for society - and to understand how inequalities of income, wealth and poverty are functional, we need to dig a little deeper.

Perhaps the classic modern Functionalist statement concerning the functions of social inequality is that of Gans (1971), when he argued inequalities of income, wealth and poverty had “13 main functions” which we can group, for our convenience, into four main categories:

1. **Economic functions** relate to ideas such as the poor being available to do “society’s dirty work” - the various menial tasks (emptying bins, flipping burgers and so forth) someone has to be prepared to do. The presence of a group of low-waged poor people also creates employment for middle-class professionals (such as social workers, for example).

2. **Social functions** cover areas such as norm maintenance - the poor “can be identified and punished as alleged or real deviants in order to uphold the legitimacy of conventional norms”. The fact the poor are criminalised more than other social classes also, according to Gans, serves a boundary-setting function - it shows people where the limits of acceptable and unacceptable behaviour lie.

3. **Cultural functions** include things like “guaranteeing the status” of those who are not poor (“In every hierarchical society, someone has to be at the bottom”) and as a guarantor of upward social mobility for those “just above them in the class hierarchy”.

4. **Political functions**: The poor, being relatively powerless (and less likely to vote than other social groups) can be scapegoated in various ways (for their laziness, lack of sexual morality, criminality and so forth.) Their existence also guarantees the existence of political parties to “represent their interests”, thereby providing a democratic counterweight to political parties representing the middle and upper classes.

While it’s sometimes difficult to know when Gans is being serious and when he’s taking the opportunity to poke fun at such arguments (“…the poor help to keep the aristocracy busy, thus justifying its continued existence”, for example), his ideas do give us a general flavour of the way Functionalisists address the (sociological) problem of social inequality.

However, they’re also indicative of what Bolender (2004) terms neofunctionalism; that is, developments in Functionalist thinking in the latter part of the 20th century. Gans, for example, doesn’t necessarily see
In many ways the basic ideas underpinning New Right perspectives on social inequalities reflect those of the more basic forms of Functionalist argument, in that inequalities of wealth and income are generally seen as both beneficial to, and necessary for, the health of any given society. Given this theoretical lineage it’s not too surprising that New Right perspectives are sometimes referred to as Neo-functionalist perspectives.

However, since New Right theorists have a number of distinctive strands relating to both the way they see the relationship between society and the individual and how they view inequality we’ve decided to go with the category of “New Right” (rather than Neo-functionalist) here - although as we’ve suggested the difference between them may more apparent than real. On this basis, we can start to understand New Right perspectives in terms of:

**Individualism:** This idea sits at the very heart of New Right thinking about the nature of both people and society; ideas about individual liberty and the freedom to pursue economic goals (such as becoming wealthy) are fundamental to this perspective. From these basic concepts springs a range of ideas about “human nature” and social organisation - the former being based on ideas about:

**Rationality:** People are viewed as rational beings who make informed choices about their behaviour. In this respect, individuals, not governments, are best placed to make these choices based on:

### Tried and Tested

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<th>Question</th>
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<tr>
<td>(a) Explain the meaning of the term “meritocracy”</td>
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<td>(b) Suggest two ways in which the UK education system is meritocratic</td>
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<td>(c) Suggest three reasons for seeing poverty as functional to society</td>
<td>(6 marks)</td>
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<td>(d) Assess the view that poverty is functional for society</td>
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We can apply this idea to economic behaviour generally. For example, faced with a decision about whether to accept a low-paid job or receive a similar (or greater) level of government welfare benefit, any rational person would choose the latter. The consequence of this may be companies competing in global markets simply relocate to countries (such as India) where wages are lower. Not only does this contribute to higher levels of unemployment, it effectively creates a group of people who become “unemployable”. If
potential rewards of economic success. Responsibility, competition and the New Right, through individual work - and this is achieved, for the others, to be allowed to reap the rewards of their success (and, consequently, suffer the pains of their lack of ability, application or effort).

Social reasons: For the New Right, societies are moral systems in the sense they hang together on the basis of how people view their relationship to others. Inequality, for example, is considered “fair” if people are allowed the opportunity to be successful and, in so doing, keep the fruits of their efforts. Someone who, for example, “creates wealth” by employing others should, in this respect, be allowed to benefit from their hard work, dedication and sacrifice. Welfare systems provided by governments, on the other hand, are morally wrong because they encourage people to live off the work of others.

Inequality, therefore, has social benefits because it encourages people to work to support themselves and their dependents (the family system is a crucial component of New Right thinking - it represents the “social glue” that binds people together in productive work). Poverty, in this respect, is generally viewed in absolute terms (although, somewhat confusingly perhaps, it also has a relative dimension) in the sense that in modern, Western, societies (such as Europe and America) few - if any - people experience the absolute forms of poverty characteristic of some areas of Africa and South America. Poverty is, in this respect, relative for Western societies - it is simply part of the price that has to be paid for a dynamic, wealth-creating system.

Cultural reasons for poverty (in particular), are bound up in the actions of governments (see below) in terms of the way their behaviour both enhances and restricts the expression of individual choices. In some ways the concept of choice (about whether to pursue educational qualifications, for example) is bound up in values, in the sense of people making rational decisions about how to behave (to marry and start a family, for example - or not as the case may be). The choices people make about their lives, therefore, affect their behaviour and help to explain the social distribution of income, wealth and poverty.

In terms of the above type of analysis, it’s not difficult to understand how New Right perspectives generally view inequalities in income, wealth and poverty. We can outline these ideas in terms of four general categories:

Economic reasons: Because, as we’ve suggested, people are seen as rational beings, they need incentives to behave in particular ways; if, as a society, people want a certain standard of living (one that involves comfortable housing, personal transport, the latest technology and so forth) they have to be motivated to work - and this is achieved, for the New Right, through individual responsibility, competition and the potential rewards of economic success.

A high income, for example, is a reward for working hard at school to get the qualifications required to become a doctor or a lawyer; in a meritocratic society, everyone has the chance to achieve these things - some choose to pursue such goals while others choose not to. The important point here, of course, is the incentive is present - people, in other words, have to be allowed to reap the rewards of their success (and, consequently, suffer the pains of their lack of ability, application or effort).

Dependency culture - a situation where an increasing number of individuals and their families literally depend on government welfare for their existence. This, in turn, creates what New Right theorists such as Murray and Phillips (2001) have termed an:

Underclass - people who exist “outside” the normal limits of society. They represent a group who effectively fail to participate in the day-to-day activity of the society in which they live. Such people, according to writers such as Murray, are dependent on State benefits, have little or no economic incentive to work, fail to take responsibility for their families or children and are over-represented in criminal activity.

This idea, in some respects, reflects Functionalist notions of social solidarity - the idea people need to feel connected to and responsible for others. The underclass, because it is not integrated into mainstream society through mechanisms such as work, is effectively excluded from the normal workings of mainstream society - except, of course, in terms of how their behaviour (high levels of illegitimacy, child and family neglect and criminality) impact on the quality of life in mainstream society.

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A high income, for example, is a reward for working hard at school to get the qualifications required to become a doctor or a lawyer; in a meritocratic society, everyone has the chance to

AS Sociology For AQA

low-skill, low-paid work is exported to other countries, the existence of State-financed welfare systems simply means we create a group of people who have little or no incentive to work; it creates, in other words, a:

Dependency culture - a situation where an increasing number of individuals and their families literally depend on government welfare for their existence. This, in turn, creates what New Right theorists such as Murray and Phillips (2001) have termed an:

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New Right: Explanations

In terms of the above type of analysis, it’s not difficult to understand how New Right perspectives generally view inequalities in income, wealth and poverty. We can outline these ideas in terms of four general categories:

Economic reasons: Because, as we’ve suggested, people are seen as rational beings, they need incentives to behave in particular ways; if, as a society, people want a certain standard of living (one that involves comfortable housing, personal transport, the latest technology and so forth) they have to be motivated to work - and this is achieved, for the New Right, through individual responsibility, competition and the potential rewards of economic success.

A high income, for example, is a reward for working hard at school to get the qualifications required to become a doctor or a lawyer; in a meritocratic society, everyone has the chance to

Wealth, Poverty and Welfare

Inequality, therefore, has social benefits because it encourages people to work to support themselves and their dependents (the family system is a crucial component of New Right thinking - it represents the “social glue” that binds people together in productive work).

Poverty, in this respect, is generally viewed in absolute terms (although, somewhat confusingly perhaps, it also has a relative dimension) in the sense that in modern, Western, societies (such as Europe and America) few - if any - people experience the absolute forms of poverty characteristic of some areas of Africa and South America. Poverty is, in this respect, relative for Western societies - it is simply part of the price that has to be paid for a dynamic, wealth-creating system.

Cultural reasons for poverty (in particular), are bound up in the actions of governments (see below) in terms of the way their behaviour both enhances and restricts the expression of individual choices. In some ways the concept of choice (about whether to pursue educational qualifications, for example) is bound up in values, in the sense of people making rational decisions about how to behave (to marry and start a family, for example - or not as the case may be). The choices people make about their lives, therefore, affect their behaviour and help to explain the social distribution of income, wealth and poverty.
Bane and Ellwood (1994) identify three main ways the choices people make relate to poverty and, by extension, inequality:

1. **Rational choices**, as we’ve already suggested, involve the idea people decide how to behave. They “survey the options available to them and make a rational choice of the option that will bring them the greatest satisfaction”.

2. **Expectancy choices** involve the idea “that people make choices based on whether they expect the decision to have the desired outcome”. If a society, for example, encourages people to study and work (because they see the future benefits for both themselves and their family) this is the route most people will choose.

3. **Cultural choices** relate to the culture within which people live. Middle class cultures, for example, tend to stress values such as deferred gratification, the importance of means of social mobility and the like. Lower class cultures, according to the New Right, tend to develop a fatalistic acceptance of poverty - they develop into a dependency culture or a culture of poverty - a cultural situation which locks people into poverty as Bane and Ellwood put it: “If sanctions against a behaviour like unwed pregnancy are missing, it will occur”.

**Political reasons**: For the New Right, the role of government is mainly one of creating the conditions under which people can successfully - and fairly - compete against each other for economic rewards. In this respect, government should support strong (dual-parent) families (and, by extension, discourage the development of single-parent families) and maintain the safety of citizens through law-and-order policies that allow people to go about their lives in relative comfort and safety. Governments should not involve themselves in welfare since this, it is argued, actually contributes to increased social and economic inequality in a number of ways - such as:

**Discouraging individual enterprise and responsibility**: Welfare, for example, has to be paid for by taxing those in work, leaving them with less of their own money and restricting their ability to provide for both themselves and their dependents. State welfare systems increase social fragmentation by creating resentment of the poor.

**Encouraging dependency** amongst the poor by locking them into a welfare system they either don’t want to escape from (for reasons already noted) or cannot escape from because they would earn less money by working than if they remained on welfare benefits.

A crucial idea here, according to Murray (1984), is “the destruction of status rewards”: as he puts it, although “…not everyone can be rich, a person can enjoy ‘status’ by being a hard worker or a secure provider for his or her children”. If government policies have the effect of removing status differences and rewards, therefore, social problems develop.

**Tried and Tested**

(a) Explain what is meant by a “cost / benefit analysis” (2 marks).
(b) Suggest two reasons why some occupations attract higher pay than others (4 marks).
(c) Suggest three ways in which welfare systems create a “culture of dependency” (6 marks).
(d) Examine the suggestion that the choices people make are the cause of social inequalities (24 marks).
(e) Assess New Right explanations of poverty (24 marks).

Does the existence of a Welfare State create a “culture of dependency” that contributes to the very problem (poverty) it is designed to eliminate?
These perspectives (think in terms of New Labour in Britain since 1997) share a number of ideas with both Functionalist and New Right explanations about the distribution of wealth, income and poverty (for example, the view some form of economic inequality is both necessary and desirable); where these perspectives diverge, however, is in relation to poverty, the social characteristics of the poor and - in a significant departure from New Right thinking - the role of the State in welfare provision.

In Britain, some social democratic approaches have attracted the label of a:

Third Way (see, for example, Giddens 1998, 2000); in other words, they seek to develop policies and explanations that sit between, on the one hand, the New Right belief social inequality is desirable and “Old Left” (or Marxist) belief it is undesirable.

In this respect, social democratic perspectives tread the line between, on the one hand, seeing income and wealth inequalities as positive features of any society (for reasons we will explore in a moment) and, on the other, seeing too great a level of inequality as being damaging for both society (in terms of social exclusion, the waste of human resources and the like) and the individual, considered in terms of the problems and suffering caused by poverty. In general, therefore, we can identify the key components of this perspective in terms of five main ideas:

1. Meritocracy: Inequality, from this perspective, is desirable as long as it’s based on merit. Those who work hard, use their abilities constructively and so forth should be allowed to accumulate private wealth and achieve higher incomes. Differences between individuals and groups in terms of income, therefore, stem from this idea of merit; people have different skills and levels of qualifications, for example, and differential rewards serve to motivate people to acquire the skills and knowledge needed by different economic sectors (the dedicated and talented are thus rewarded for their efforts by higher incomes). The ability to accumulate wealth also, of course, produces income differences, since the rich are allowed to live off the (unearned) income of their wealth.

Tony Blair, in a speech to the Institute for Public Policy Research (1999), expressed these ideas quite nicely when he argued there needed to be “Ladders of opportunity for those from all backgrounds, no more ceilings that prevent people from achieving the success they merit”. These views are, in turn, related to the idea of:

2. Competition based on people having different talents, aptitudes and abilities that, by-and-large, they are free to use in whatever way society deems legal. However, where social democratic perspectives take leave of New Right perspectives is over the idea of a:

3. Mixed Market Economy: That is, an economy characterised by both private and public (State owned) economic activity. Economic ownership, in this type of economy, is mainly in private hands (either individuals or, more-usually, shareholders), although in some circumstances the government may own an industry (such as the railways and coal mines in the UK from the middle to the latter part of the 20th century - a situation known as Nationalisation). Even where governments don’t directly own industries, however, they play an important role in the:

4. Regulation of economic activity, through the legal and taxation systems, for example. Thus, the role of the State here might extend to things like equal opportunity laws (as happened Britain in the 1970’s with the introduction of both the Sex Discrimination Act - making
it illegal to discriminate on the grounds of sex - and the Equal Pay Act - making it illegal to pay men and women different rates for doing the same job. Governments may also legislate for things like standards of workplace safety, a minimum wage and so forth. In addition, taxation policies may be designed to place limits on personal income and wealth and, in some instances, redistribute wealth via a:

5. Welfare State: This involves a number of ideas; in Britain, for example, the State has provided “free-on-demand” medical and educational provision, paid for by taxes on income (production taxation) and spending (consumption taxation). However, the main idea of interest in this context according to Veenhoven (1992), “Guaranteeing their citizens a minimum level of living, by providing income supplements and/or services”. Of social equality to that of equality of opportunity, which involves:

Responsibilities: The idea that the role of government is to encourage people to participate in the workplace wherever possible. Thus, various government schemes (aimed at getting, for example, lone parents into work by helping to provide childcare) are based on the idea, the best way to help people escape from poverty is to turn them into working, productive, members of society.

Inclusion: This involves the belief paid work - and the ability to support oneself and one’s family - is the best way to tackle social exclusion. Giddens (1998), for example, suggests a redefinition of “social equality” to mean social inclusion - the idea everyone should be encouraged, through State help if necessary, to play a part in the society in which they live.

Opportunity reflects the central problem faced by government in a mixed market economy, namely that of how to promote social integration (or inclusion in New Labour terms) within the parameters of a fundamentally unequal society. The solution, in social democratic terms, is for governments to provide opportunities through education, welfare training schemes and the like - for people to work.
As a general perspective (focusing for the sake of convenience on the basic ideas shared by different types of Marxists), Marxism focuses on the idea of:

**Conflict**: While this idea covers all types of social conflict, the main focus is on economic conflict and the relationship between:

**Social classes**: At its most basic level, class conflict is based around the relationship between the:

- **Bourgeoisie** (or ruling class) - those who own and control the means of economic production (land, factories, machinery and so forth) and the:

- **Proletariat** (or subject class) - those who sell their labour power (their ability to work) to the highest bidder.

In this respect, economic inequality - in terms of vast differences in income and wealth, for example - leads to social inequality (differences in social status, lifestyles and so forth) and is based on the concept of:

**Profit** (or surplus value, as Marxists like to call it). In basic terms, surplus value is the difference between what an employer pays to produce commodities (goods and services that can be sold) - labour costs, general production costs, the price of raw materials and so forth - and the price for which they are able to sell these commodities. For example, for the publisher of this book the difference between what it costs to produce (the writing, editing, publishing and distribution costs, for example) and the price for which they sell it to you, is their profit - the “surplus value” added over and above the costs of production. The main reasons for the existence of profits are, according to Marxists:

**Exploitation**: The relationship between those who own the means of production and those who do not is, fundamentally, one in which the former exploit the latter. This is because, in a capitalist economy, ownership involves the private retention of profit. In simple terms, owners pay their workers less than the cost of whatever it is they produce and, consequently, are able to keep (or appropriate) the difference between production cost and selling price for themselves. In this situation:

**Inequality** is an inevitable feature of life in capitalist societies. The distribution of both income and wealth, for example, will always be unequal - there will always be those who are rich and those who, relatively speaking, are poor. This follows because of the economic structure of this type of society - inequalities of wealth and income are, by definition, built into the fabric of capitalist society; they are, in short, the very bedrock (or economic base) on which this type of society is built.

Unlike Functionalist, New Right and Social Democratic perspectives that, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, see economic inequality as necessary and / or desirable, it should come as no great surprise to learn Marxists see it as neither. Where Social Democratic perspectives, for example, see the reform of capitalism as a major goal - through systems of progressive taxation (the wealthy paying increasing higher rates of tax on their income and wealth, for example, to pay for social reforms) and the like, Marxists argue social and economic inequality can only be eliminated by the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism and the subsequent development of a Communist society.

However, until such a society comes into being, Marxists focus on the key question of how social inequality - based on the unequal distribution of income and wealth - is maintained in capitalist societies. They answer this question in a number of ways:
Ideology: As we’ve previously seen, writers such as Althusser (1971) highlight the concept of ideological State Apparatuses (such as the education system) and their role in convincing people they live, for example, in the best possible type of society, that social inequality is inevitable and necessary and so forth. The role of cultural institutions such as religion and the mass media are also highlighted here in terms of their ideological (or socialising) role. Form this perspective, religions such as Christianity have, for example, historically stressed the importance of accepting the social order as “God given” and the media project a general world-view favourable to the interests of the ruling class.

Force: Althusser (1971) points to the idea of Repressive State Apparatuses (such as the police and armed forces) as a factor in maintaining order and, by extension, protecting the status quo. In basic terms, if a society is fundamentally unequal and the role of the police is to uphold the law, their behaviour simply serves to “maintain the existing unequal social order” (or, in other words, to keep things as they are).

Hegemony: Part of this idea suggests people come to accept (enthusiastically or grudgingly) the existing social order. They may, for example, see it as “right and proper” that inequality exists or they may, the other hand, want to change things but feel powerless to achieve such an aim.

In this situation, Marxists point to a number of distinctive ways capitalist societies promote social inequality by:

Economic means: An example here might be the concept of a:

Reserve army of labour: This involves the idea of people being brought into the workforce at times of full production and labour shortages and then sacked or made redundant in periods of economic downturn. Traditionally, women have, according to Feminist writers such as Bruegal (1979), been treated in this way - partly because of the housewife role many women are still expected to play. In this respect, the argument here is women can, more easily than men, be forced out of the public sphere (workforce) and into the private sphere (the home) because of their traditional role as domestic labourers.

In addition, groups such as the unemployed also constitute a reserve pool of labour that can be dipped into by employers when they need additional labour. Evans (2002) has given this idea a somewhat novel twist by noting how, in Australia (as in many European countries) poorly paid and relatively low-status research students are employed on a part-time, casual, basis to carry out University-based research. Once they are no longer required, they simply return to the pool of labour seeking further (short-term) work.

For Marxists, this idea of a labour reserve is important because it can be used to lower the wages of other employees. If a reserve army of labour exists in society - willing to be brought into and excluded from the workforce at various times - it lowers the job security of employees and makes them less likely to push for things like wage increases for fear of being replaced by people willing to work for less money.

Political means: The role of the State is an important one in maintaining social inequality through their provision of welfare services. Strange as it may seem, Marxists tend to view the role of welfare provision as being crucial in maintaining inequality because it protects “the poor” from the worst excesses of inequality. By providing a safety net, governments help to diffuse potential conflicts, lower rates of illegal activity and generally help to maintain the status quo from which the ruling class, quite literally, profit the most. Welfare, from this perspective, perpetuates inequality in a couple of ways:

- Poverty is marginalised in the sense few people, if any, are allowed to fall into the kind of abject poverty that might lead to a questioning of an economic system that allows some to enjoy vast personal income and wealth while others starve.

- Policing: Where governments provide for the poorest in society, one outcome of this is an increased surveillance of those who receive welfare benefits. Social workers, for example, become a form of “soft policing” because of their day-to-day involvement with their clients (checking on their current situation, offering advice on behaviour changes and so forth).

Module Link

The education system, along with religious institutions, also plays a major socialising role in our society.

Tried and Tested

(a) Explain the concept of hegemony (2 marks).

(b) Suggest two reasons for seeing social inequality as “inevitable” in Capitalist society (4 marks).

(c) Suggest two reasons for the argument that ideological control is more effective than force (6 marks).

(d) Examine Marxist arguments about the origin and nature of inequalities of wealth and income (24 marks).

(e) Compare Marxist views on social inequality to either those of Functionalists or Social Democrats or the New Right (24 marks).
As we noted in the Introductory Chapter there are a variety of different feminist perspectives. However, for the purposes of this section we will consider “feminism in general”, in terms of the way feminists have considered and explained social inequalities.

Unsurprisingly, the traditional focus of feminist perspectives on economic inequality has been on the fact women, historically, have lower incomes (as the following table demonstrates), own less wealth and are more likely to experience poverty, than their male counterparts.

We can explore Feminist explanations for the relative levels of male - female inequality in terms of a range of ideas:

Social Segregation: Traditionally, men and women in our society have had differential access to - and participation in - different social spheres. For example, men have tended to be more heavily involved in the:

- **Public sphere** of the workplace, which gave access to a range of factors contributing to social inequality (income, social networks and wider relationships, for example). Women, on the other hand, were more likely to be involved in the:

- **Private sphere** centred on the home, domestic and family roles and responsibilities.

In such a situation, female dependency on men was fairly easy to demonstrate since it involved inequalities of power based on who earned and controlled family income and who didn’t. As Ramsay (1994) notes, Feminists have traditionally argued the separation of the spheres “…affect [female] access to jobs and to participation in public life generally…inequalities at work reflect and reinforce [a] subordinate position in the private domestic sphere in that typical ‘women’s work’ is an extension of their domestic roles, and the low pay and low status attached to this work mirrors the devaluing of their domestic tasks”.

However, as Ramsay suggests, a distinct separation between the two spheres can’t be easily maintained in the light of women’s increasing participation in the workplace (and the suggestion men are far more involved in family life than in the past). Labour Force Survey figures (2006), for example, show that in 1985 men filled 2.0 million more jobs than women. In June 2005 the numbers were similar, with each of the sexes performing about 13.3 million jobs.

Although a clear “public - private” sphere distinction can’t be easily maintained in relation to British society as a whole in the 21st century, we can make a passing reference here to:

Cultural and subcultural differences in male - female participation in the different spheres. Some ethnic, age and social class groups, for example, maintain a stronger sense of gender separation than others (an idea that reflects what feminists term “areas in which gender, class and ethnicity intersect”).

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**Women way behind on pay**

*BBC News: 21/02/00*

“Women who choose career over family earn less during their working lives than male colleagues in the same job…many women were being paid less than men simply because of their sex.

This backs up figures from the Equal Opportunities Commission, which says that women get paid only 80% of the average hourly male earnings. The Equal Pay Act of 1970 was introduced to prevent exactly this inequality”.

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**University 'break equal pay laws':**

*BBC News: 04/04/00*

The pay difference between men and women of the same grade:

- Anatomy / physiology professors: £8,000
- Veterinary science professors: £7,000
- Agriculture / forestry lecturers: £4,950
- Nursing lecturers: £1,558

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**UK working mothers earn less:**

*BBC News: 06/03/02*

Career women’s lifetime wage losses, compared to men:

- No qualifications: £197,000
- GCSE qualifications: £241,000
- Graduate qualifications: £143,000

Lifetime wage gap between mother and father of two

- Low skills: £482,000
- GCSE skills: £381,000
- Graduate skills: £162,000

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**Working mothers' pay compared to men.**

*Centre for Analysis for Social Exclusion (1999)*

- Women with 1 child paid 8% less
- Women with three or more children paid up to 31% less.
However, even though it may no-longer be the case there is a clear and rigid gender separation between the two spheres, we need to be aware the “public - private” distinction may not have disappeared, as such, but merely changed in form. Feminists, for example, point to the way it seems to operate in terms of:

**Economic segregation:** In it s most general form, gender segregation operates, according to this perspective, in terms of a *dual labour market*:

- **Primary labour markets** involve, according to Marshall (1999), jobs that provide “security, career development, firm-specific training and an extensive benefits package”. They are also more likely to involve full-time, well-paid, work.

- **Secondary labour markets** on the other hand - as Marshall notes “…provide little in the way of training, job security or internal promotion prospects”. They’re also more likely to consist of low-paid, low-skill, part-time work whose “…most obvious and important characteristic…in the UK is that it is undertaken by women”.

Walters (2002) further suggests secondary labour markets are characterised by a “plentiful supply of women seeking part-time work…and, until recently, poor legal and social protection as employees”.

This basic distinction goes some way to explaining gendered income inequality since women are more likely than men to be involved in part-time work (as the following table demonstrates):

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<tr>
<td>Employee Status</td>
<td>Male</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Full-Time</td>
<td>11.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Part-Time</td>
<td>1.2</td>
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More recent figures from the *Labour Force Survey* (2006) confirm this particular trend; male and female workforce participation rates, although similar in number, show one very significant difference, namely that “almost half of the women’s jobs were part time compared with around one in six of the men’s”.

Although Edwards and Robinson (2003) characterise part-time work as a “…marginalised form of cheap labour and precarious employment largely found in low skill jobs that can be organised efficiently on a part-time basis”, writers such as Atkinson (1987) and Hunter et al (1993) have argued income inequality can’t be exactly explained by different forms of labour market participation.

As Marshall, for example, notes: “It would seem females whose labour market participation is constrained by domestic responsibilities often end up working part-time for employers who offer less attractive terms for all their employees, rather than occupying peripheral jobs with firms who offer much better terms and conditions of employment to core workers”. This idea, therefore, leads to a consideration of:

**Workplace segregation** as an explanation for economic inequality. As Dolado et al (2003) point out, this idea works in two ways:

- **Vertical segregation** involves the idea particular occupations (and workplaces) are *vertically stratified* by gender; they involve clear gender divisions between those at the top and those beneath them. Hakim (1981) expresses this idea in terms of: “Vertical occupational segregation exists when men and women both work in the same job categories, but men commonly do the more skilled, responsible or better paid work”. In general - even in occupations where there is a gender mix - men occupy the higher positions (and receive higher levels of income) than women. Wise (2004), for example, points out “Men are over-represented in higher nursing grades and spend less time getting there”. One consequence of this, as the *Equal Opportunities Commission* (2004) notes is that “Vertical segregation limits career development that would enable women to earn more”.

- **Horizontal segregation** involves the idea men and women do different types of work. The *Equal Opportunities Commission* (2004), for example, notes: “75% of working women are still found in just five occupational groups”:
  - Associate professional and technical (e.g. nursing).
  - Admin and secretarial work
  - Personal services (such as caring for children or the elderly).
  - Sales and customer service.
  - Non-skilled manual work.

The Commission argues: “Jobs which are classified as women’s work command lower wages than men’s work even when they require similar qualification levels, leading to inequalities in pay and income”.

Although we’ve focused on explanations for income inequalities related to gender, we can note how both *wealth inequalities* and *poverty* are also related to gender (we will examine the latter in more depth on the next section).

**Wealth inequality**, for example has both current and historical dimensions:

**Current dimension:** In terms of the areas at which we’ve looked, women have fewer opportunities than men to accumulate wealth through working. It may, therefore, seem somewhat surprising to note that, according to Datamonitor (2004), there are more wealthy women in the UK than men (“Nearly 393,000 women holding more than £200,000 in cash, shares and bonds, compared with 355,000 men”). This situation is explained partly by the relatively low definition of wealth and partly in terms of Rownlinson...
et al’s (1999) observation that the highest levels of wealth are found amongst the elderly; since women live longer in our society than men they are more likely to inherit their partner’s wealth. The Sunday Times Rich List (2004) paints a somewhat different picture of wealth amongst the very rich in our society. Of the richest 1100 people in Britain, 93% (1,022) were men.

Historical dimension: Traditional forms of wealth distribution amongst families, for example, have followed the idea of patrilineal descent (inheritance down the male line). Until the 19th century, for example, women were effectively barred from wealth ownership and, as you might expect, change in this respect has been slow. Men, in general, have had far greater opportunities than women, historically, to accumulate wealth through inheritance.

Feminism: Explanations

In terms of the ideas at which we’ve just looked, for “2nd wave” Feminist perspectives at least (see Chapter 1 for a discussion of this idea and its relationship to post-feminist or “3rd wave” perspectives) they are all, in their various different ways, underpinned by the concept of:

Patriarchy: In basic terms, this involves the idea of male domination - something that, for Feminists, is at the root of gender inequalities across all areas of society. Various forms of male domination (in the private as well as the public spheres) are supported, according to this perspective by:

Patriarchal ideologies that seek to explain and justify men’s continued domination and exploitation of women. In this respect, income inequalities, for example, are justified in various ways:

Male family wage: That is, the idea men need to be paid more because, as primary providers their income is spread through the family group - an idea that ignores both the primary family role played by many women and the fact income levels between men don’t reflect differences in family status; a single man doing the same job as a man with a family to support is paid the same wage.

Biological programming: Some (non-sociological) perspectives (such as Sociobiology - or Evolutionary Psychology as it now prefers to be known) argue males and females have different biology-based abilities and capabilities.

• Men, for example, are biologically programmed for aggression which makes them more suited to hunting and, its modern-day equivalent, the workplace.

• Women, on the other hand, are programmed for nurture, which makes them better suited to the home-making role. Sociological versions of this idea appear in the idea of a female:

Affective role - the idea, common among traditional Functionalist writers such as Goode (1964), women have a nurturing role to play as a counterpoint to male breadwinning roles.

As the following suggests, however we view the notion of patriarchy and patriarchal ideologies, in any society where economic inequality is encouraged, competition between men and women for control of resources (such as income and wealth) is likely to have a patriarchal element, given men have, historically, been better placed - both culturally and economically - to discriminate against women on the basis of sex.

UK is ‘still a man’s world’
Source: Office for National Statistics (2001)

“Men are still getting a better deal at work and at home despite years of campaigning to promote sexual equality. Men do much less cooking and housework than women and are still rewarded better in their careers. The gender pay gap is still evident and men hold more high-powered jobs than women, even though more women are working.

Family life is changing, with men no longer always being seen as the primary providers, but men are still not pulling their weight in the home: ‘Traditional roles in the home may still exist with women undertaking the bulk of domestic chores’.

Work life: Men also have higher wages despite equal pay legislation, and ‘outnumber women in management and in many professional occupations’...despite evidence women are now ‘outperform men at many levels of education’.

The average gross wage for men is £247 a week, compared with £119 for women. Average gross earnings for women peak in their mid-20s at about £180 a week. Men, on the other hand, steadily rise in earning potential to an average £350 a week for the ages 35-50”.

Tried and Tested

(a) Explain the concept of “patriarchal ideology” (2 marks).

(b) Suggest two ways women are exploited in the workplace (4 marks).

(c) Suggest three ways that patriarchy affects the distribution of wealth and income in our society (6 marks).

(d) Examine how the concept of workplace segregation contributes to inequalities of wealth and income between men and women (24 marks).

(e) Assess Feminist views on gender inequality (24 marks).
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Hunter, Laurie; McGregor, Allan; Maclnnes, John and Sproull, Allan (1993) “The ‘flexible firm’: strategy and segmentation” British Journal of Industrial Relations Vol. 31, No. 3.


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3. The existence and persistence of poverty in contemporary society.

Existence and Persistence: Introduction

As we've seen in the previous Sections, there is a methodological debate (and not just within Sociology) over how the concept of poverty should be defined. This debate – broadly couched in terms of absolute or relative definitions – is a significant one since the type of definition – and measurement – used to understand poverty determines to some extent of poverty to be found in any society.

Absolute definitions, for example, tend to produce less evidence of poverty while relative definitions produce the reverse.

In addition, the way in which you chose to define and measure poverty has a significant impact on how you are likely to see the existence and persistence of poverty in contemporary society. Adopting an absolute position, for example, suggests that improved standards of living will, at some point in the future, result in the eradication of poverty - or at least that abject level of human degradation (“minimum human biological needs”) that forms the baseline of some absolutist definitions.

Adopting a relativist position, on the other hand, effectively means two things. Firstly, that some form of poverty has always existed (and will always exist) and secondly that its persistence can be explained by reference to levels of social inequality (which, in itself as we’ve seen, is a criticism frequently aimed at relativists – they don’t define and measure “poverty”, as such, but rather levels of social inequality). This follows because by defining the concept relatively (the difference between what, say, one group in society has and another group doesn’t have) effectively means that “poverty” can never be eradicated. In contemporary Capitalist societies such as the UK there will always be some form of social inequality – and hence relative poverty – since this situation is built into the very economic structure of our society.

While it’s important to keep the above debate in mind when examining ideas and argument about the existence and persistence of poverty, in this Section we can develop these observations to look at a range of sociological arguments which, for our convenience, we can discuss in terms of two broad perspectives.

The first focuses on what we can term:

1. Individualistic (or cultural) explanations of poverty: These positions generally explain the existence and persistence of poverty in terms of the perceived qualities of individuals; that, in fairly basic terms for the moment, the “causes of poverty” are located in the behaviours and actions of individuals (and the groups to which they belong – hence the idea that this general position often refers to membership of cultural groups (“Chav culture”, “Underclass culture” and so forth) as a source of explanation for poverty). “Solutions to poverty” (something we discuss in more detail in Section 4) tend to be couched in terms of how individual / cultural behaviours can be changed in order to move such people out of poverty.

The second general perspective, on the other hand, can be termed:

2. Structural explanations of poverty since these, unlike their individualistic / cultural counterparts, focus on the idea that explanations for the existence and persistence of poverty are to be found in the economic and political structure of contemporary societies. This position, therefore, locates the causes of poverty in “structures of inequality” (class structures in Marxist terms, gender structures in Feminist terms and so forth). “Solutions to poverty”, in other words, are only to be found by changing the social structure of the society that creates poverty – individuals alone (whether the poor themselves, charitable institutions such as religious organisations or philanthropic members of the upper class) are neither responsible for – nor able to resolve – the problem of poverty.
Explanations for poverty grouped under this general heading focus on the qualities possessed (or not as the case may be) by individuals and the groups to which they belong. This being the case, if poverty is a “quality of the poor” it follows any explanation for its existence and persistence is based on some form of:

**Absolute definition** of poverty (either biological or, more usually, cultural - a minimum level of earnings, for example). This follows because, if the behaviour of the poor is a cause of their poverty, any solution to poverty (something we will discuss in more detail in the next section) will focus on how the poor need to change their behaviour - which means there must be some form of poverty line against which to measure who is - and who is not - in poverty.

In terms of this general type of explanation, we can identify and discuss a range of different theories, beginning with the idea of a:

**Culture of poverty**, originally developed by the anthropologist Oscar Lewis (1959, 1961). In his study of Mexican and Puerto Rican societies, Lewis wanted to understand poverty in a cultural context; that is, he wanted to understand how the poor adapted to and coped with the fact of their poverty; in this respect, he argued poverty, like any other form of cultural activity, was:

- **Socially organised**: Rather than seeing poverty as simply being caused by random events (such as illness or disease) or natural forces that struck different people at different times, Lewis argued the persistence of poverty across generations meant it needed to be understood in terms of:

- **Socialisation process**: In other words, adults who experience poverty as a set of objective conditions (such as the effects of long-term unemployment, low rates of pay for those in work, illness, disability and so forth) learn to cope with the fact of living in poverty and, in the process, pass this knowledge on to their children (in the same way those who live outside poverty pass their accumulated knowledge on to their children). The persistence of poverty, therefore, is explained by the way each generation socialises the next generation with the knowledge and skills required to live in poverty.

As should be apparent, if a culture of poverty develops it does so because it performs certain functions for the poor (hence we can associate writers like Lewis with a broadly functionalist perspective). These include:

- **Informal economies**: For example, the use of pawnbrokers as a way of budgeting on limited resources or informal borrowing and lending arrangements with friends and neighbours.

- **Present orientations**: The idea of “living for today” and worrying about what will happen tomorrow or the next day when (or even if) it arrives.

- **Informal living arrangements**: A lack of commitment to institutions such as marriage which would involve trying to provide for others as well as oneself.

On the other hand, a culture of poverty is, ultimately dysfunctional (damaging to both individuals and societies) because it represents a:

- **Self-defeating strategy**: By adapting and coping, the poor do not address the problems that create poverty in the first place (things like lack of employment and low wages). The development of informal economies, for example, may lead to the introduction of moneylenders into the economy of poverty. Borrowing money in this way may resolve a short-term problem (paying the rent, for example) but it creates a much more serious long-term problem since the money not only has to be paid back, but paid-back with punitive rates of interest.

A further dysfunctional aspect of a culture of poverty is the “absence of childhood”. Lewis, for example, noted children, at an early age, were expected to be economically active - to “earn their keep” and contribute, if they could, to a family income; the problem here, of course, was the absence of schooling - low rates of literacy were common amongst the poor Lewis studied - and since education is one of the main (long-term) routes out of poverty the poor were, effectively (and unknowingly) perpetuating their own poverty.
Cultural theories have been influential as a way of studying and explaining the existence and persistence of poverty and, as you might expect, they’ve been revised and updated over the years. The following, for example, takes one particular aspect of the culture of poverty thesis - the idea the adaptive behaviour of the poor contributes to their continued poverty - and develops it into a theory of:

The Underclass: This theory, associated with New Right perspectives in America - through political scientists like Murray (1999) - and Britain, through the work of politicians such as Field (1989, 1995), argues the very poor in America and - to a more limited extent - Britain, constitute a “class apart” from mainstream society. They are, according to this argument, a class who not only exist at the very bottom of the society but who are also socially excluded in terms of income, life chances and political aspirations.

O’Brien and Briar (1997) notes New Right theorists frequently make an important (ideological) distinction between two groups:

1. The deserving poor - those who, through little fault of their own, find themselves in poverty (and who, to some extent, try to lift themselves out of this situation - hence the idea they are deserving of help). This group, for example, might include the “working poor” who struggle to exist on low wages.

2. The undeserving poor - those who are (supposedly) happy to exist on the margins of society, living off State benefits, indulging in various forms of petty criminality and who, for whatever reason, make little or no effort to involve themselves in the day-to-day life of mainstream society.

Jencks (1989) argues that, on the basis of this type of distinction, New Right perspectives generally talk about the undeserving poor in terms of three types of failure:

- **Moral**: They routinely indulge in deviant / criminal behaviour.
- **Economic**: They are unable (or unwilling) to get paid work.
- **Educational**: They lack cultural and educational skills and qualifications.

The underclass, therefore, are seen to contribute to their own social exclusion by their rejection of the values and norms of wider society. In other words, membership of the underclass is defined in terms of the choices made by its members; for example, the failure to pursue educational qualifications leads to economic marginalisation and the development of a morality based around criminality and a dependence on the rest of society to support their deviant lifestyles through State benefits. In terms of who the undeserving poor actually are, however:

Membership varies according to different writers. Saunders (1990), for example, identifies the underclass in terms of the poor, educationally unqualified and those irregularly or never employed.
2. Baseline effort. underclass: relationship between a dependency culture and the particular view of the underclass adopted. In this economic criminality). In-hand, no tax work as well as various forms of themselves in the (officially) working means they are free to involve comfortable lifestyle, the fact the poor can live without supports existence of State welfare systems and payments both Dependency culture related to that of the underclass, namely a:

- Illegal drug-taking.
- Criminality and casual violence.
- Illegitimacy.
- Failure to find and hold down a job.
- Truancy from school.

In addition, disproportionately represented amongst this class are:

- Ethnic minorities (especially, but not exclusively, Afro-Caribbean).
- People trapped in run-down council estates or decaying inner cities.
- Young single people.
- Single-parent families.

For the New Right (especially in America), the development of an underclass is, somewhat perversely, also a consequence of the behaviour of mainstream society, in two main ways:

Welfare systems providing various forms of economic support shield the poor from the consequences of their behavioural choices. By supporting poverty, welfare systems also support:

Deviant lifestyles and moralities: The poor are shielded from the effects of the moral choices that contribute to their poverty. For example, single parents who choose to have children they cannot support (because they can’t work and look after children at the same time) are actively encouraged by a welfare system that effectively pays (through benefits funded through taxation) for their (deviant) moral choices.

These ideas lead to a further theory of poverty, closely related to that of the underclass, namely a:

Dependency culture: The basic idea here is the existence of State welfare systems and payments both supports and traps the poor in poverty, depending on the particular view of the underclass adopted. In this respect, we can note three basic views about the relationship between a dependency culture and the underclass:

1. Generosity: Benefits are so high they provide the underclass with a comfortable existence for little or no effort.

2. Baseline: Although benefits may not provide a comfortable lifestyle, the fact the poor can live without (officially) working means they are free to involve themselves in the hidden economy (the world of cash-in-hand, no tax work as well as various forms of economic criminality).

3. Low wage work: Member of the underclass, almost by definition, lack the educational skills and qualifications to find highly-paid work. Their working options, therefore, are largely limited to low-skill, poorly-paid, work. Where welfare benefits are pitched at even a reasonably generous level, therefore, it’s not in the economic interests of the underclass to take low-paid employment. It’s interesting to note, in this particular context, the New Right “solution” to this problem is not to force employers to pay higher wages (since that would interfere with the workings of free markets) but rather to cut the level of State benefits.

In any of these situations, those who become dependent on the State for their existence become detached from wider society and are effectively excluded from participation in that society. O’Brien and Briar (1997) characterise this New Right view of dependency in the following terms: “Beneficiaries, it is argued, constitute a separate culture...with a different set of values and beliefs from the values and beliefs that exist in the society at large. ‘Dependence’ is a state enjoyed and relished. It is an argument...reflected, for example, in the...claim five year olds were entering school looking forward to life on social security benefit as their occupational aspiration”.

Social Exclusion

In Britain, the idea of an underclass has tended, politically, to be expressed in a slightly different form. Although American New Right theorists (such as Murray) generally focus on the qualities of the poor as the cause of their poverty, British writers like Field have, in some senses, characterised the “underclass poor” as victims of:

Forces of Expulsion from society, which include:

- Unemployment.
- Widening class differences.
- Exclusion from rapidly rising living standards.
- Hardening of public attitudes to poverty.

In this respect, a softer version of underclass theory, largely associated with Social Democratic perspectives on poverty, has developed around the concept of:

Social exclusion: Duffy (1995) defines social exclusion as the “inability to participate in the economic, political, social and cultural life of a society” (which, if you think about it, sounds very much like a definition of relative poverty). The notion of exclusion reflects, according to Howarth et al (1998) “Renewed concern about not just poverty, but the degree to which groups of people are being excluded from participation in work, lack full access to services and in other ways find themselves outside the mainstream of society”.

From this perspective, therefore, while poverty may have many causes, some relating to wider structural influences (such as economic changes within labour markets - discussed in more detail below - that create widespread unemployment) and some relating to the lifestyles and culture of the poor, the “problem” for mainstream society is considered to be one of:
Social integration: In other words, the political problem of how to ensure the poor do not become culturally (as well as economically) detached from mainstream society. The government-funded Social Exclusion Unit, for example, has identified three general areas of potential social exclusion and suggested ways of “reintegrating the excluded” into mainstream society by introducing changes to different environments:

- **Physical**: This involves integrating people by improving local and national transport systems, housing and neighbourhood renewal, community regeneration and so forth.

- **Cultural** measures involve cutting crime and teenage pregnancy, reducing the fear of crime, improving access to educational training and skills and ensuring health services are accessible to those who need them most.

- **Economic**: This involves understanding the causes of unemployment (and its relationship to areas such as health and crime). Social integration initiatives have also focused on paid work as an inclusive force. Schemes to involve the unemployed in training and employment (so-called “welfare-to-work” schemes) have also proved a popular political solution to social exclusion.

In Britain, the social democratic concept of exclusion is subtly different from the New Right version of underclass theory; where the latter locates poverty in the behaviour and practices of the poor - Horowitz (1995), for example, sees poverty as being explained “…more by self-destructive behavior (sic) - crime, drug abuse, bearing children out of wedlock and a lack of commitment to education - than mere material want” - the former sees poverty in terms of a mix of material and cultural factors.

As Welshman (2002) argues: “In drawing on the concept of social exclusion, New Labour has been keen to distance itself from the longer-term ‘underclass’ discourse”. Keeping this in mind, therefore, we can note how the idea of social exclusion has been based on the idea of a:

**Cycle of Deprivation**: For this type of theory, deprivation is usually considered in terms of material factors (such as a low family income) having cumulative, cultural, effects. A simple example might be:

Parents living on a low income (material deprivation) means their children have a poor diet, which causes health problems and missed schooling and leads to educational failure (cultural deprivation) which, in turn, leads to low-paid, low-skill work. When these people start families of their own, the cycle begins anew. An example of this type of theory might be expressed in the following report of research suggesting a link between poverty and school truancy.

**“Link between Poverty and Truancy”:**

Source: **BBC News**: 07/07/02

“Children are more likely to skip school if they come from poor families. Research carried out by Ming Zhang found a close link between poverty and truancy among primary school children. The study, examined statistics from London boroughs between 1997 and 2000”

This theory, as we’ve represented it, doesn’t involve the poor being “committed to poverty”, nor are they (directly) to blame for their poverty (a process sometimes called “blaming the victim”). Rather, a range of social and economic factors, whose effect is cumulative (hence the idea of a cycle or chain of events), lead to the persistence of poverty down the generations.

**Tried and Tested**

(a) Identify two characteristics of the “deserving poor” (4 marks).

(b) Suggest two differences between individualistic and structural explanations of poverty (4 marks).

(c) Suggest two ways in which a culture of poverty may be functional for its members (4 marks).

(d) Outline cultural explanations for the existence and persistence of poverty (24 marks).
Although we will look more closely at cultural explanations in the next section (which discusses possible solutions to poverty), we can note a number of general ideas about the basic concept of:

### Cultures of Poverty

When we think about this idea (as originally theorised and presented by Lewis) we need to ask three basic questions:

1. **Do they exist?**
   - Although the concept itself is a plausible one, it depends for its currency on the existence of a reasonably stable group of people, co-existing in poverty over time (and by time we’re talking generations). The evidence we have suggests poverty - at least in Western societies such as Britain - doesn’t necessarily have this basic characteristic.

   **Drever et al** (2000), for example, note that, measured in terms of income, in the 6 years between 1991 and 1997, 50% of the bottom fifth of the UK population (the very poorest in our society) moved out of this category. This suggests, at the very least, a large population churn, something also suggested by Jarvis and Jenkins (1997a) when they note: “Although only a minority of the population have a low income in any given year, many more people experience low income at least once over a four-year period”. Furthermore, “Fluctuations in income are experienced by people at all income levels. There is some evidence that mobility is greater in the very poorest and the very richest income groups”.

   On the other hand, Jarvis and Jenkins also note that, as ever, concepts of poverty largely depend on where a poverty line is drawn: “90% of those in the poorest tenth of the population remain in the bottom three-tenths a year later”. The situation is further confused if we focus on a particular group of poor.

   **Howard and Garnham** (2001), for example, argue poverty is likely to last longer for children, in the sense that where children are born into poverty (as opposed to becoming poor, for whatever reason, in later life) they find it very difficult to escape from that poverty - it is, they argue, something they carry with them into adult life. The Department for Work and Pensions (2002a), confirm this idea when they note how

2. **Are the poor homogeneous?**
   - In other words, if we assume, for the sake of argument, a “hard core” poverty-stricken group does exist in our society, do they have the same basic social and cultural characteristics? When we look at “the poor” in our society, although it’s possible to identify broad groups with similar characteristics, the evidence for homogeneity - and hence the development of cultures of poverty - is patchy. We can, for example, note:
   - **Ethnic minority groups**, particularly Pakistani and Bangladeshi minorities, feature more heavily in poverty statistics, according to Oxfam (2003).
   - **Regional variations** in our society exist in the extent, experience and distribution of poverty. Department for Work and Pensions (2002b) statistics, for example, show the North-East and South-West of England experience higher levels of poverty than the South-East of England.
   - **Age variations**: Different age groups have different experiences of poverty - to be young and poor is different to being elderly and poor, for example.
   - **Women** are more likely than men to be at risk of poverty (Department of Social Security, 2001) and reasons for this include the greater likelihood of their being single-parents and, because of longer life expectancy, widows. This observation, however, leads us to our final question, namely:

3. **Is poverty communal?**
   - A significant aspect of cultures of poverty is their communal character; such cultures develop in a situation where the values and norms of the poor are continually reinforced by people in similar social situations. However, it’s interesting to note how, when those in poverty speak for

   If people in our society can move out of and back into poverty at various points in their family life-cycle what does this tell us about “cultures of poverty”?
Wealth, Poverty and Welfare

Moore (2001a) identifies a range of different types of capital which we can note (with illustrative examples) in the following terms:

1. **Human capital**: This may involve such things as:
   - Labour contributions (from children / older people to working generation).
   - Investment of time and capital in education / training.
   - Knowledge / skills useful as part of coping and survival strategies.

2. **Financial / material capital**: Examples here include:
   - Money and assets.
   - Insurance
   - Inheritance, bequests
   - Levels of individual / family debt.

3. **Natural / environmental capital**: This relates to ideas like:
   - Pollution and ill-health
   - Lack of work in urban / rural areas
   - Lack of affordable transport

4. **Socio-cultural capital**: This involves:
   - Educational opportunities.
   - Parental investment in child's education.
   - Parents' experience of education
   - Traditions and value systems.

5. **Socio-political capital**: This relates to things like:
   - Ethnicity
   - Gender
   - Class
   - Family background
   - Religion
   - Disability
   - Access to key decision-makers.

**Transmission Theories**

In light of the above, Moore (2001a) argues “Controversial ‘culture of poverty’ theories suggest people become and remain poor due to their beliefs and behaviours…it may be more relevant to consider ‘cultures of coping’ among the poor, and ‘cultures of wealth’ among the rich and middle class as significant factors in keeping the poor in poverty”. Rather than thinking in terms of a culture of poverty, Moore suggests we should view poverty in terms of:

**Inter-Generational Transmission (IGT)**: This represents a sophisticated attempt to understand the persistence of poverty in terms of the interplay between a range of cultural and structural factors. In addition, it provides a bridge between the overtly-cultural theories we’ve just examined and the “structural poverty” theories we’ll consider in more detail in a moment.

Moore outlines the key elements of IGT as being the “Intergenerational transfer…and absence of transfer of different forms of capital: human, social-cultural, social-political, financial / material and environmental / natural”. In other words:

**Cultural transmission** is a complex process involving a range of capitals we can note, for convenience, under two main headings:

1. **Material capital** involves things like parental ability to provide financially for children. Gregg et al (1999), for example, used a longitudinal study of children born in 1958 to show how “Social disadvantage during childhood is linked to an increased risk of low earnings, unemployment and other adversity by the age of 33”.

2. **Non-material capital**, includes cultural traditions, values and experiences. Shropshire and Middleton (1999), for example, noted how non-material values were transmitted between generations. Children of single-parent families, for example, had “lower expectations about their future than their peers” - they were, for example, less likely to consider professional qualifications and occupations.
Before moving on to consider an alternative set of explanations for the existence and persistence of poverty we can note that, historically, individualistic/cultural explanations for the existence and persistence of poverty have proven popular with governments, media, researchers and the general populace alike, for reasons that are not particularly difficult to identify—these types of explanation variously:

- **Blame the victims** of poverty for their situation by reference to the supposed moral qualities (or indeed lack of same) of the poor. In this respect the causes of poverty are located in individual failings, whether these be laziness, moral laxity, stupidity or whatever.

- **Absolve** governments (and indeed the well-off) from either blame or responsibility. If poverty is the fault of reckless individuals then it follows neither governments nor those not in poverty can be held accountable for this situation. However, in some respects this also opens up the possibility for:

**Humanitarianism**, in that it is possible to move people out of poverty (those who want to be helped or who, through misfortune, find themselves in poverty) is a variety of ways. Some focus on the symptoms of poverty (providing food and shelter for the homeless, for example) while others strike at the “root of the problem” (as it is theorised by these approaches) by attempting to make cultural changes in the behaviour of the poor. In other words, the solution to poverty is a change in the attitudes and behaviours that “cause poverty” and it is here that governments and individuals can “make a difference” — either through the type of “Tough Love” policies pursued in America in recent times (removing welfare benefits from the unemployed, single parents and so forth) or the “Soft Love” policies generally pursued by British governments over the past 50 years involving the provisions embodied in something like the Welfare State.

To complete this part, the following article (written from a broadly New Right ideological position) contains a range of assertions about the nature of both poverty and the poor and raises some provocative questions about poverty (and its solution) in contemporary Britain:

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**AS Sociology For AQA**

Wealth, Poverty and Welfare

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<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Tried and Tested</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>(a) Identify two ways material capital differs from non-material capital (4 marks).</td>
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<td>(b) Suggest two ways in which “the poor” are not an homogeneous grouping(4 marks).</td>
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<tr>
<td>(c) Explain the difference between a Culture of Poverty and Cycle of Deprivation(4 marks).</td>
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<td>(d) Examine how “cultures of coping” and “cultures of wealth” might contribute to poverty (24 marks).</td>
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<td>(e) Assess individualistic / cultural explanations for the existence and persistence of poverty (24 marks).</td>
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**Structural Perspectives: Observations**

In 1901 Seebohm and Joseph Rowntree published one of the most significant social studies of poverty in the 20th century—a study that was a ground-breaking piece of research in two ways:

Firstly, it attempted to **systematically** and **empirically** document the existence and experience of poverty in a British city (York) in a way that attempted to demonstrate that poverty was not simply a misfortune visited on the reckless and morally bankrupt—as the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (2004) put it “In his 1901 study...Rowntree argues that poverty is a direct result of low wages, contradicting a common view that poor people were responsible for their own situation. His study marks the beginning of a period in which research has a growing impact on the development of social policies. It is also highly influential in establishing a statistical and scientific approach to the measurement of poverty”.

Secondly, it suggested that the existence and persistence of poverty could be explained in structural terms; that is, in terms of forces existing beyond the

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**Will the poor always be with us?**

www.telegraph.co.uk: June 18, 2007

“The British appear to have resigned themselves to the fact that millions of their fellow citizens are mired in dependency. Even as unemployment falls, the numbers of those on benefits rise. But the United States ended its national welfare programme in 1996 and moved both funding and policy to state level. The numbers of Americans receiving welfare were reduced by 60 per cent - or three million people - and rather than tipping people into poverty, the new approach propelled them into work.

A similar transformation could be achieved in Britain by returning power to councils and communities...Frank Field, the former minister whose reports have laid bare the failings of New Labour’s approach, urges that local benefit teams be given the freedom to use their expertise.

Would a new approach cut the numbers on welfare and help them back into jobs? Or is poverty now so built into the system - and dependency into people’s lives - that we are doomed to exist side by side with an underclass? Will the poor always be with us?”
reach and control of those in poverty whose operation was the root cause of such a condition. As the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (2004) note: “For Joseph Rowntree tackling poverty is not about simply giving money to solve the immediate problem, it is about dealing with the "underlying causes". In 1904, he writes "The Soup Kitchen in York never has difficulty in obtaining adequate financial aid, but an enquiry into the extent and causes of poverty would enlist little support".

Structural explanations for the existence and persistence of poverty, therefore, examine the way individual behavioural choices are limited (or extended) by structural factors in contemporary society. Whereas the kind of theories we’ve just considered (individual or cultural) share a couple of common themes (the behaviour of the poor is a social problem and the causes of poverty are found in the attitudes and lifestyles of the poor themselves), for this second set of theories the causes of poverty are located in areas such as the behaviour of governments and / or the wealthy and economic conditions and changes in society. In this respect, therefore, we can identify a range of structural theories of poverty, beginning with the idea of:

### Labour Market Changes

Since the 2nd world war at least, our society - in common with many societies around the globe - has witnessed a relative decline in manufacturing industry, in terms of the number and type of products built and the number of people employed. One reason for this, as the following extract illustrates, is the relocation of some manufacturing industries from the UK to other countries (where production costs are much cheaper).

**Dyson production moves to Malaysia**

*Source: Gribben (2003)*

“Entrepreneur James Dyson was involved in a fresh row over exporting jobs yesterday after announcing he planned to switch production of washing machines to Malaysia with the loss of 65 jobs. The decision means the end of manufacturing for Dyson in Britain after last year’s decision to move vacuum cleaner production to Malaysia, where production costs are 30% lower. The transfer resulted in the loss of 800 jobs”.

Alongside this long-time decline, however, has been a rise in the numbers employed in service industries (such as banking and information technology at the well-paid end and call centres and sales at the low-paid end). We can note how such changes have impacted on poverty in a number of ways:

**Unemployment**: Although this concept, for a variety of reasons, is difficult to measure reliably (different governments, for example, use different indicators of unemployment), it’s clear one consequence of changing labour markets over the past 25 years in Britain has been fluctuating levels of unemployment - something that’s especially true among manual workers (one consequence of the loss of manufacturing jobs).

**Regional**: In this respect, experience of poverty in the UK can be characterised as fragmented. Areas, such as the North of England and Scotland, with high levels of manufacturing (such as car assembly and ship-building) and extraction industries (such as coal-mining) have experienced higher levels of unemployment than areas with lower levels of manufacturing and higher levels of service industry, such as the South-East of England. Bennett et al (2000), for example, note how “Coalfield communities remain blighted by widespread unemployment, long-term sickness and poverty a decade after the collapse of the mining industry” and Evans et al (2002) have noted that although “Every neighbourhood in England has benefited from strong economic growth and falling unemployment since the mid-1990s”, the rate of change has varied. This has led, they argue, to greater polarisation between the richest and poorest regions.

**Income**: Although levels of measured unemployment have fallen in recent years, a further consequence of labour market changes has been the replacement of relatively high-paid manufacturing work (especially semi and skilled manual jobs) with lower-paid, insecure, service sector work. As Bennett et al note “Companies have been able to hire people willing to work flexibly for low wages, often in non-unionised workplaces. The new jobs have often been part-time...Much of the work created has gone to women – creating tensions in communities where men have traditionally seen themselves as breadwinners”.

**Globalisation**: A further structural development we can note is the insecurity of some service sector jobs (call centres being an obvious current example - as the following extract illustrates). The globalisation of telecommunications and computer technology, for example, has opened up opportunities for companies to employ cheaper labour, in countries such as India, to service customers in the UK.

**Profits of loss**

*Source: Denny, The Guardian, 25/11/03*

“South Africa and India are the new destinations of choice for British companies looking to cut costs. Call centres and IT processing, and even such high-skilled work as pharmaceutical research, are being "offshored". White-collar workers are discovering they are as vulnerable to competition from cheaper workers abroad as steelworkers and shipbuilders a generation ago. Unions fear the service sector is about to repeat the experience of manufacturing, which has lost 3.3m jobs since 1980”.
A second form of structural argument, related to the idea of labour market changes and the impact of economic globalisation, is the idea - largely associated with Marxist perspectives - that some form of poverty is:

**Inevitable** in Capitalist society. This follows because such societies are, by definition, unequal in terms of the distribution of wealth and income. In any economic system where competition is the norm, relative differences will always exist. The main question here, however, is how you define poverty. In absolute terms, for example, few people in our society could be considered poor; in relative terms, however, it’s clear there are wide disparities between the richest and poorest sections of society.

More controversially perhaps, we could note the idea of poverty as a:

**Necessary** condition of capitalism - the idea that the existence of the poor (or relatively deprived if you prefer) is useful for a *ruling class* since they can be used as a *reserve army of labour* whose existence can be used to control wage levels and hence profitability. One aspect of this “necessary and inevitable” relationship between poverty and capitalism is the concept of:

**Social Segregation**: Structural theories of poverty have suggested the existence of economically segregated groups leads to *social segregation* and, in some instances, *physical segregation* - the existence, for example, of private *gated communities* that are a feature of some American cities and which are increasingly common in the UK. **Atkinson and Flint** (2004), for example, found “around 1000 such developments” which, they argue, relate to “patterns of interaction and separation which suggest an attempt to reduce fears of victimisation and promote privacy”.

One downside of poverty (for a ruling class) is the fact the poor - as with other members of society - are *consumers*; if they can’t afford to buy goods and services, profitability suffers. For many Marxists, therefore, the idea of a welfare system is significant, mainly because it provides some form of *safety net* for those at the bottom of society. This leads us to note a further aspect of structural approaches to poverty:

**Poverty Trap**: In any *means-tested* welfare system (that is, one in which people receive different levels of benefits based on things like their income and savings), the problem of a poverty trap is always likely to exist. This is because, as someone’s income rises (they move, for example, from unemployment into work or from part-time to full-time work) their welfare benefits are accordingly reduced.

For example, if for every extra £1 earned through employment, State benefits are similarly reduced, this creates a disincentive to work (if you’re unemployed) or to take full-time work (if you’re employed part-time). This is because, effectively, you’re not being paid any extra money for the extra work you do. In an attempt to reduce this “disincentive to work”, benefit reductions are increasingly staggered as earnings increase. However, according to **Department for Work and Pensions** figures (2004) over 2 million Britons are currently caught in a poverty trap.

One reason for this involves considering a slightly different example - a situation where an unemployed person with a family to support loses a range of benefit payments if they find employment. If the level of income they lose from the State isn’t matched or exceeded by the income they can get from paid work, this individual (and their family) will, effectively, be worse-off than if they take paid employment.

A final aspect of structural approaches to poverty we can note is the idea of the:

**Feminisation of Poverty**

According to the **Institute of Development Studies** (2001) “…there is little clarity about what the feminisation of poverty means”. Notwithstanding this unpromising start, the concept generally relates to the idea the existence and persistence of poverty can be linked to female lives (as head of households) and experiences (of low-paid, part-time, work, for example). In this respect, the argument is that women experience:

- More poverty than men.
- Worse poverty than men.
- An increasing trend to greater poverty.
AS Sociology For AQA

**Ruspini** (2000), for example, argues any structural analysis of poverty needs to take account of its:

**Gendered nature**: That is, the idea men and women - even of the same social class or ethnic grouping - experience poverty in different ways. For example, welfare and insurance systems reflect, according to Glendinning and Millar (1999) “…their different access to, and levels of, income replacement benefits”.

**Tried and Tested**

(a) Identify two “social forces” associated with poverty (4 marks).

(b) Suggest two ways that governments may “contribute to poverty” (4 marks).

(c) Suggest two ways that governments may raise people out of poverty (4 marks).

(d) Examine the impact of structural factors on our understanding of the existence and persistence of poverty (24 marks).

(e) Assess the view that poverty is primarily a problem for women (24 marks).

**Structural Perspectives: Explanations**

Structural approaches, as we’ve indicated, focus on the way economic organisation and relationships create and sustain both wealth and poverty. In this respect, although such relationships have clear *cultural effects* (in terms of who is - and who isn’t - likely to experience poverty), structural poverty theorists argue that to understand the existence and persistence of poverty it’s necessary to understand its wider theoretical context: people fall into - or fail to get out of - poverty *not* because of their individual and social character deficiencies but because of way society is structured against them.

Poverty, from this perspective, forces people to behave in certain ways. Thus, although *Lewis* originally argued cultures adapt to social and economic conditions and, in the process, develop and perpetuate self-defeating strategies, structural theorists argue these strategies are not necessarily chosen from a wide range of possibilities; rather, they are “chosen” because they the only ones available to the poor. Rather than blaming the victims of poverty for their poverty, therefore, structural approaches seek to understand how and why there are victims in the first place. Given this observation, we can dig a little deeper into structural approaches by thinking, in the first instance, about poverty as:

**Risk**: This approach starts by taking note of the structural factors in any society relating to poverty. For example, we’ve already noted a selection of these in terms of things like: the nature of the economic system; regional differences relating to different types of labour market (and how changes in labour markets result in differences in employment and unemployment) and the impact of globalisation on national and international markets. In addition, we’ve noted how the risk of poverty may be associated with cultural factors such as gender and ethnicity.

Once these structural factors have been theorised, poverty can then be generally *mapped* in terms of our ability to identify different social groups who are at greater risk of poverty than others. This concept of risk-*mapping* moves us away from the simple cultural identification of “at risk” groups - characteristic of individual approaches to explaining poverty - for a couple of reasons:

1. **Structural conditions**: Different structural conditions create greater or lesser risks of poverty (which, as ever, will always depend on how poverty is defined).

2. **Poverty conditions**: We’ve noted a central problem with individualistic / cultural theories of poverty is the fact those considered to be “in poverty” at any given moment do not necessarily remain in poverty all their lives. On the contrary, the cyclic nature of poverty frequently means people (or whole groups) move into and out of poverty at different points in their life cycle. This suggests, therefore, that although the identity of “the poor” may change - in terms of specific individuals - the condition of poverty itself remains; it simply involves different people at different times.

We can understand this idea by thinking about *Berthoud’s* (1998) observation that “Pakistani and Bangladesi families in Britain are almost four times as likely to be living on low incomes as white households”. *Berthoud* identifies four major “risk factors” for these groups:

- High male unemployment.
- Low levels of female economic activity.
- Low pay.
- Large family size.

The point to note, here, is *not* that poverty is explained in terms of the specific cultural characteristics of these minorities; rather, it’s that any group sharing these characteristics is likely to risk falling into poverty.

Similarly, *Bardasi and Jenkins* (2002) found the “risks of old-age poverty for those retiring early are strongly linked to occupation”. Managerial and professional workers, as you might expect, have a reduced risk of poverty - but so do manual workers. Clerical or sales occupations, craft and service workers (police officers...
and waiters, for example) on the other hand “may be especially vulnerable if they stop work early”.

Although the general concept of risk can contribute to our understanding of poverty, attempts have been made to refine this idea in order to relate it specifically to structural factors. We can look at an example of this in terms of:

**Memberships Theory**

Durlauf (2002), argues this type of theory can be used to examine how poverty is related to the way “various socioeconomic groupings affect individuals” and their behavioural choices, in terms of two different types of group:

- **Exogenous** group membership would include things like gender and ethnicity. In a sense, we can think of membership of these groups largely in terms of ascribed characteristics; for example, as we have seen with ideas like the feminisation of poverty or the relationship between ethnicity and poverty risk, individual life chances can be generally related to membership of such groups.

- **Endogenous** group membership, on the other hand, relates to the specific social and economic circumstances of the individual - Durlauf, for example, points to areas such as residential neighbourhoods, school and work relationships as being significant factors in the poverty / non-poverty equation.

In this respect, *memberships theory* examines the interplay between structural factors, in terms of how, for example:

- **Economic segregation**, through unemployment and low pay, for example, leads to:

- **Social segregation**, in terms of the idea the poor and non-poor lead different types of life, have different cultural lifestyles and so forth, which, in turn leads to:

- **Physical segregation**, in terms of rich and poor living in different areas, the development of private, gated, communities and the like.

We can summarise these ideas in the following terms:

**Structural factors** determine the general extent of poverty / deprivation in any given society. In the UK, for example, general living standards are different to some parts of Africa and South America. In turn, these factors influence the:

- **Behavioural choices** of the rich and the non-poor, in terms of their general cultural characteristics (such as their lifestyles) which, in turn, place:

- **Cultural limitations** on the *behavioural choices* of the poor, effectively trapping them in poverty through their own group memberships and *apparent* behavioural choices. For example, schools in poor neighbourhoods may have lower status and funding, which perpetuates lower educational achievement and contributes to a “cultural poverty trap” that sits alongside the kinds of possible economic poverty traps we’ve outlined above.

In short, therefore, this theory argues structural factors **determine** the development of membership groups that, in turn, **perpetuates** the risk of poverty.

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**Tried and Tested**

(a) Identify and explain two types of risk related to poverty (4 marks).

(b) Suggest two ways that exogenous group membership may contribute to poverty (4 marks).

(c) Identify and explain two ways risk can be related to either ethnicity or gender (4 marks).

(d) Examine the structural factors in contemporary society that contribute to wealth and poverty (24 marks).

(e) Assess the argument that poverty is the result of individual choices (24 marks).


Department for Work and Pensions “Opportunity for All”, 2004


4. Different responses to poverty, with particular reference to the role of social policy since the 1940s.

Responses to Poverty: Introduction

This Section looks at different responses to poverty, with particular reference to the role of social policy since the 2nd world war and we can combine the organisational structure of the previous two sections as a way of providing a general continuity to our exploration and understanding of poverty. This section, therefore, is generally organised around the two basic approaches to poverty outlined in the previous section (individual and structural approaches). Within each general category we can locate the various perspectives on poverty we encountered when examining explanations for the distribution of poverty (which, to refresh your memory, were: New Right, Social Democratic, Marxist and Feminist perspectives).

We can begin this section by looking firstly (for no particular reason) at possible cultural responses to poverty which, for our purposes, involve examining New Right and Social democratic perspectives in contemporary UK society.

New Right Responses: Observations

From this perspective, “solutions to the problem of poverty” are constructed around three general areas:

Economic liberalism: For the New Right, the crucial variable in any fight against poverty is the creation of wealth and, from this perspective, economic inequality is the means towards securing the best possible standard of living for the largest number of people. Although inequality may, at first sight, seem an unlikely means towards securing this general aim, we need to remember New Right perspectives generally subscribe to an absolute definition of poverty.

Thus, although there will always (necessarily) be inequality, how poverty is defined is crucial to its solution.

A simple way to illustrate this idea is to think in terms of the total amount of wealth in a society as being like a pie (an economic pie, if you will - bear with us, it does eventually make sense).

The Economic Pie

In the first illustration imagine the share of total wealth (including, for the sake of argument, income) owned by the poorest 50% of the population is represented by the missing slice. In this instance, let’s further imagine the poor do not have a large enough share of total wealth to keep them out of absolute poverty.

In the second illustration, the pie has increased in size and, although the relative shares are the same (assuming, once again, the missing slice is the share of wealth owned by the poorest 50% of the population), those at the bottom of society now have enough wealth to keep them out of absolute poverty.

This example suggests that the most significant idea here is not "who owns what amount" of the total wealth in any society, nor their relative share of total wealth. Rather, what is important, from this general perspective, is the idea that the greater the amount of wealth created and...
Wealth, Poverty and Welfare

Wealth creation: Given the key to solving poverty is to create wealth, individuals must be allowed free reign (within certain limits defined by fair competition) to make money. This, as you might expect, involves competition within the economic market-place.

Legal safeguards: For wealth creation to occur successfully, certain preconditions need to be in place. These, for example, relate to things like how wealth may be legally acquired and kept (privately, since you ask). The role of government is seen to be that of enforcing rules of fair competition, safeguarding the rights of property-owners and the like. Any society that allows unproductive individuals (or criminals as they’re sometimes known) to steal from wealth producers is effectively creating a huge disincentive to wealth creation - an idea that leads into:

Low taxation: The activities of criminals are not the only disincentive to wealth creation; the more a government takes from people in taxation, the greater is the disincentive to create wealth. For the New Right, no personal taxation would be the ideal, but some form of taxation is required to maintain the second general idea, namely a:

Minimal State: Sowell (2002) notes how the New Right sees the main role of government as ensuring the operation of free economic markets, in terms of setting and maintaining basic “rules of social order” (as we’ve noted, free markets are only seen to operate efficiently and successfully under conditions of personal security). The State, however, does not have a role to play in providing:

Welfare systems for the poor. This is because welfare is seen to: shield people from the consequences of their behaviour (an inability to compete in the market place because they’ve failed to gain the qualifications they need, for example); distort the workings of markets by providing a safety net for failure (the New Right, as I hope you’ve discovered, don’t mince their words in this respect); create disincentives for those in work because a proportion of their income goes to support those who exist within a dependency culture (namely, the underclass).

In terms of the above, New Right responses to poverty are based around two major policy areas:

Free-markets: Business should be privately owned and subject only to very light regulation by the State (minimum wage levels, for example, shouldn’t be set by law). Private businesses represent the means to “expand the wealth of the nation”, thereby ensuring everyone is kept out of absolute poverty.

Anti-Welfarism: The existence of welfare systems is seen as part of the “problem of poverty” and part of any solution must be to remove the poor from dependence on the State by eliminating all forms of State-sponsored welfare.

In terms of social policy, therefore, the Market Liberal approach outlined above - characteristic of New Right writers such as Marsland (1996) - involves a number of specific ideas for resolving the twin problems of an underclass and a dependency culture:

Universal welfare provision is harmful to society because it limits personal freedom of choice and responsibility. It should be abolished because it fails to help those who most need help (which reflects the distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor we noted in a previous section).

Private insurance systems should be encouraged to allow individuals to choose their personal levels of insurance. This encourages personal and family responsibility.

Family groups (by which is generally meant dual-parent, heterosexual families) should be encouraged and aided by the State since it is this group, governed

For the New Right “private” is always best - whether it be private hospitals, private schools, private insurance or indeed private prisons (this looks very welcoming, actually).
by ideas of love, trust and affection, that forms the cornerstone of personal and social responsibility. In other words, where people require help they should look first to their family, not the State.

Charitable and Voluntary groups should be encouraged to support and supplement the basic welfare provision provided within the family.

Alcock (2006) summarises the general New Right view in terms of the following ideas:

**The role of government** (the State) is not to become involved in the provision of welfare (since government intervention is considered to make social problems worse by interfering in the workings of “free economic markets”). Rather, welfare provision is a matter for individuals and families who make rational choices about their behaviour – to have children, when to have them, how many to have and the like.

**Dependency cultures** develop once rational individuals come to understand that “the State” will both provide and save them from the consequences of their choices; a woman, for example, who chooses to have a child outside marriage will receive State help and economic support – something, the New Right argue, that becomes an important element in such a decision.

**Removing state support** is seen, ultimately, as the means to remove poverty (by which they mean absolute poverty); in an affluent society like the contemporary UK there is sufficient work paid at a sufficient level to ensure that everyone has the opportunity to have a decent lifestyle.

**New Right Responses: Explanations**

When thinking about New Right explanations for - and responses to - poverty, they assume “the poor” are a socially homogeneous, relatively stable and easily identifiable group. Although the evidence for this is, at best, inconclusive, the general uncertainty around this idea is magnified when we consider:

There are a range of problems we can note with this general theory, the first of which is that is the major one of:

**Definition**: As Jencks (1989) notes, underclass theory “…focuses attention on the basement of the…social system (those who are ‘under’ the rest of us), without specifying what the inhabitants of this dark region have in common”. He notes, for example, “a dozen different definitions” of the underclass, each one providing a different estimate of its composition, size and social significance. Buckingham (1996), for example, wants to define the underclass in terms of “…dependency on the state”, a general category that includes those in receipt of State benefits and council house tenants. Writers such as Murray (1999) are more specific when they include single mothers, the long-term unemployed, various types of petty (and not-so-petty criminal) and so forth. A casual sweep through the British popular Press reveals a long list of potential - if not necessarily actual - members of the underclass: Joy riders, ram raiders (remember them?), meth’s drinkers, single mothers, the unemployed, the long-term unemployed, black youths, benefit claimants, “Chav’s” and hunt saboteurs to name but a few.

The following article by Phillips (2007) probably ticks just about every box in the (populist) New Right position in a way that sums-up their general ideas and arguments about the relationship between “welfare” and “poverty”.

**Jobless couple with 12 children are given a £500,000 home**

Source: Newling and Bates (2007)

It's the type of highly-desirable family home that is well beyond the reach of many middle-class professionals. A detached period house, with eight bedrooms, a garden, its own driveway and all set in a leafy residential area of well-to-do Newbury, Berkshire.

But Carl and Samantha Gillespie - together with their 12 children - have been able to move in without paying the slightest heed to Britain's sky-rocketing house prices. In fact the couple have been given the keys without lifting a finger in work. They receive the equivalent of £44,000 a year in benefits, a figure made up of £1,500 a month housing benefit; £1,200 a month child tax credit; £560 a month child benefits; £280 job seeker's allowance and £1,600 a year in council tax.

When asked why they don’t work, the couple say that looking after their children is a full time job. And they claim they would earn less working than they do claiming the dole. Mr. Gillespie has revealed that he quit a job stacking shelves at Asda before he had even started, when he realised the £300 a week he would earn would result in a £400 benefits cut. Mr. Gillespie, 34, said: "We're not scroungers and if it was economical for me to work then I would do".
It is the welfare state which, more than anything else, has created the culture of incivility, irresponsibility, family breakdown and disorder... The direct link between welfarism and the 'me-society', between welfare rights and the erosion of the ties of duty that should bind us together, is unmistakable.

...[Charles] Murray...erupted onto the public scene back in the Nineties with his explosive theory that welfare...had caused widespread fecklessness, dishonesty and, above all, illegitimacy, creating through a dependency culture an underclass of people whose uncivilised behaviour was so extreme they had become detached altogether from normal society. A lot of people were put off not only by the uncompromising tone of his language, but by his radical proposals, which were widely interpreted as allowing the feckless poor to starve.

Many more Britons are hooked on the dependency culture as benefits were renamed tax credits and applied ever higher up the income scale. Yet since Labour came to power, it has spent a staggering £60 billion on 'welfare reform'. The vast welfare bureaucracy enables the Government to intrude ever more into people’s lives, particularly in the areas of family life and child-rearing. And through providing financial incentives for lone parenthood while penalising couples, it has positively encouraged family disintegration, the single most important factor behind our culture of selfishness and disorder.

The crucial point was that welfarism detached behaviour from its consequences. It held that material need must be met, regardless of behaviour. It did this to avoid making the distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor that was associated with Victorian callousness towards the poverty stricken. But this in turn created a destructive Catch 22.

By meeting need regardless of how people behaved, it provided incentives for the kind of behaviour which only created even more dire need. Take family life. The Government says welfare must meet the needs of whatever kind of household they live in. This is the principle behind child benefit, surely the most effective engine for the mass production of fatherlessness - and consequently child misery - that could ever have been devised. If a young girl has a baby without a father on board, the state says it must be ‘non-judgmental’ about her behaviour and focus instead entirely on provision for the child. So the young lone mother gets a range of welfare benefits and a council flat. But those benefits, which enable such girls to live what appears to them to be an independent life, provide an incentive to get pregnant - and to do so over and over again.

Lister (1996) suggests the problem of definition is largely resolved by those who advocate the existence of an underclass, through thinking in moral, rather than material, terms. The underclass, in this respect, includes any group who are considered, for whatever reason, “morally undesirable”. As Jencks (1989) notes “The term underclass, with its echoes of the underworld, conjures up sin, or at least unorthodox behaviour. Low income may be a necessary condition for membership in such a class, but it is not sufficient”.

This lack of definitional precision - let alone concrete evidence of its existence - has led to the suggestion the underclass is:

Mythical - both in the sense of the term being used to stigmatise the behaviour of the poor and in the sense it’s used by writers such as Moore (2001b) when he observes: “The underclass is invisible because it doesn’t exist...” (at least, not in the way writers such as Murray have used the term). Spicker (2002) also argues underclass theories are both too vague and, not to put too fine a point on it, wrong: “Poverty” he argues, “is a risk which affects everyone not just an excluded minority”. Finally, therefore, in terms of:

Evidence for underclass theories, Buck (1992) argues the economic evidence for an underclass in Britain is actually very thin. In particular, he notes unemployment varies with economic cycles, which means people may experience periods of semi-regular employment / unemployment, but not the permanent unemployment predicted by underclass theories. Buck characterises people who experience this type of employment pattern as: “Unstable members of the working class, not stable members of an underclass”.

Similarly, Heath (1992) found little or no evidence of a permanently excluded group of people who could constitute an underclass. Among the supposed “underclass”, he found such people were actually more likely to want work, less fussy about the types of jobs they took and no less active in the political process than other groups.
A major problem with underclass theory - apart from the elasticity of its definition (it includes, at various times, whichever social group is out-of-favour with the media) - is a failure to establish "socially excluded groups" are detached from the beliefs and values of mainstream society (whatever, in practice, these may actually be). The available evidence - drawn from both the behaviour of the poor and studies of the beliefs and values of those in poverty - suggests this is simply not the case. Although those in poverty are, to some extent, economically detached (that is, they are poorer than other sections of society) there is little or no evidence for a persistent and wilful cultural detachment supposedly characteristic of an underclass. This observation, as you might expect, leads us to cast doubt on a further feature of underclass theory, namely the concept of a:

Dependency culture: This idea is based on the assertion that those living on welfare payments come to depend on the State for their livelihood and, in the majority of cases, actually enjoy a decent lifestyle that effectively involves little or not work (both literally and metaphorically) to maintain. A few points are worth noting here, relating to:

Evidence: Dean and Taylor-Gooby (1992) found no evidence of a dependency culture among welfare claimants. What they did find was a desire to work, frustrated by problems in finding it and the low levels of wages on offer. Rather than a dependency culture they found evidence of a poverty trap.

Heterogeneity: Surprising as it may seem, Dean and Taylor-Gooby also found claimants to be a very mixed group of people, living in very different situations and circumstances. Their diversity extended to the fact a proportion of the claimants they questioned had punitive attitudes towards claimants in general.

During her recent ITV programme, Ann Widdecombe Versus The Benefit Culture, the country's most successful benefit scrounger, Mick Philpott - 18 children by five women, £38,000 a year in benefits - called Widdecombe a "bitch" and a "battleaxe" while he swaggered about his own virility. "Ignorance!" sniffs Widdecombe. On the other hand, the people she refuses to excuse for this dependency culture are the educated middle classes who have allowed the social conditions in which those like Mick Philpott thrive.

Meaning: The concept of a dependency culture is an example of the way ideas can mean different things in different contexts. For example, we could characterise all social life as involving some form of culture of dependency since any society requires its members to form dependent relationships (over such things as care for the sick, the old and the very young). We wouldn’t, for example, think about characterising (and implicitly stigmatising) young children in terms of a culture of dependency surrounding their care and nurture.

Le Grand and Winter (1987) have also noted how all social classes, to greater or lesser extents, are involved in some form of dependency culture. A range of tax credits and benefits are enjoyed by the very rich, for example, and the “middle class welfare state” effectively provides cheap health care and education for those who, in reality, need it the least.

Independence: From a Feminist perspective, McIntosh (1998) has argued the benefit system is “...an exercise in control, in which workers and claimants are powerless and trapped. And yet surveys have shown most claimants would rather be in employment... In the myth of dependency culture, some forms of dependence - wage labour, family relationships, investments, rents and pensions - are seen as normal and legitimate, so much so that they are counted as independence. Receiving state welfare, however, is delegitimized by classing it as ‘welfare dependency’.

Tried and Tested
(a) Explain the term “minimal state” (2 marks).
(b) Suggest two ways that, according to the New Right, “welfare is harmful” to society (4 marks).
(c) Suggest three reasons for the existence of an underclass (6 marks).
(d) Examine the arguments for and against the existence of an underclass (24 marks).
(e) Assess the view that solutions to the problem of poverty should focus on the removal of a “dependency culture” (24 marks).
Social Democratic Responses: Observations

From this perspective, responses to the problem of poverty are constructed around two general areas:

**Economic regulation**: Although social democratic societies are essentially Capitalist in their economic outlook (in Britain, for example, people are encouraged to accumulate and keep wealth in private hands), the role of government is theorised rather differently to the way it’s theorised by New Right perspectives. For example, in Britain since the 2nd world war we’ve experienced an economy that has mixed both privately-owned companies and industries with State-owned and controlled industries (such as coal-mining, telephones and telecommunications, transport and so forth). Having said this, during the 1980’s, the Thatcher Conservative government introduced a policy of:

**Privatisation** that saw most State-owned companies and industries being sold to private shareholders (the supply of gas and telephone services, for example, were sold in this way). The State still has some direct ownership and control (the Post Office, for example), but by-and-large it’s general economic role is now one of:

**Regulation**: That is, rather than playing a direct ownership role, governments “set the rules” for economic behaviour, in a variety of ways; through the taxation of individuals and companies, the setting of things such as a minimum wage, the creation and policing of Health and Safety regulations and so forth.

The Welfare State

Although we will examine the concept of a welfare state (and the role of voluntary and informal groups) in more detail in the final section of this chapter, social democratic perspectives, unlike their New Right counterparts, generally see an important role for government in the provision of welfare services for their citizens, for a number of reasons and in a number of ways:

1. **Economic**: Social democratic thinking in this respect extends into two main areas.

Firstly, some groups in society (such as the elderly, the sick and the differently-abled) are unable to compete for jobs and, consequently, find themselves at risk of poverty. For such people, a State-sponsored welfare system represents a safety net to prevent them falling into absolute poverty.

Secondly, economic and political changes (the influence of globalisation, for example) frequently result in some groups (as the coal mining example suggests) no longer having the skills, training and qualifications needed in the workplace. Where such people become unemployed, the welfare system provides for a period of readjustment (where they retrain, develop required skills and qualifications or simply find work in a different area of the economy).

2. **Political**: If large numbers of the poor, living in conditions of destitution, exist in society with little or no means to support themselves (either through work or welfare) this becomes a political problem for governments - not least because such people are likely to turn to illegal means of money-making (crime, prostitution, drug-dealing and so forth). A welfare system, by alleviating the worst effects of poverty, not only has general economic benefits for society (allowing people to retrain, for example), it also has general political benefits in terms of preventing social unrest, the spread of disease and the like. However, a further political consideration is the:

**Moral** dimension to welfare. This has a couple of important aspects. Firstly, in a wealthy society such as our own, is it morally right for some people to exist in conditions of poverty while others have far more money than they need? Secondly, welfare systems represent an expression of social solidarity; that is, they recognise the bonds that exist between people and reflect the idea society is not simply a “collection of individuals living in families” (as some on the New Right like to suggest) but rather, a social collective in which those who are rich and successful, for example, give something back to society by helping to support those who exist in - and on the margins of - poverty.

The above describes a relatively traditional view of social democratic thinking, reflected perhaps in the post-war development of the Welfare State. Recent thinking, however, has turned towards the idea poverty doesn’t simply have an economic dimension (not having enough money…), it also has dimensions related to participation / non-participation in social life - which is where ideas about social inclusion and exclusion come into the picture.

The “Third Way” expresses the idea of a different role for the State - one that rejects both the market individualism of the New Right and the traditional “Welfarism” of successive post-war governments in the UK (the idea, for example, all the poor require is money...).
in the form of government benefits to keep them out of poverty). The Third Way, therefore, focuses on the idea of an:

**Enabling State**, by which is meant the role of government is one that encourages people - through a variety of social policies - to play as full and active part in society as possible. By effectively redefining poverty (as “exclusion”) the role of various agencies - informal, voluntary, private and governmental - becomes that of preventing poverty by intervening at different points to break the cycle / chain of events that both cause poverty and prevent people escaping its clutches. These social policy interventions are currently coordinated in the UK through the Social Exclusion Unit (a government department linked to various welfare agencies) and include a range of policies designed to promote social inclusion in a number of areas:

**Policy Areas**

**Children and Young People**: Policies here reflect concerns about the level of teenage pregnancy (something that links into a desire to prevent some forms of single-parent family developing), how to prevent disaffection, truancy and exclusion from school and the involvement of young people in criminal behaviour.

Specific policies in this area include action to prevent criminals re-offending, problems associated with children in care caused by parental imprisonment and the like. In addition, schemes to promote youth involvement in sport and the arts are also promoted as a way of “lowering long-term unemployment” through community involvement as well as “helping to develop the individual pride and capacity for responsibility that enable communities to run regeneration programmes themselves”.

**Crime**: A range of policies have been developed to prevent adult re-offending and to punish “anti-social behaviour” - Anti-social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs), for example, can be issued against juveniles to control their behaviour (the punishment for breaking such an order can be imprisonment). Parenting orders have also been developed to make parents responsible (and punishable) for the behaviour of their children.

These policies are based on the concept of a "Cycle of Repeated Anti-social Behaviour" which, the more alert amongst you will notice, has a strong similarity to cycle of deprivation theory.

**Employment** policies are seen as the key to resolving problems of social exclusion, since unemployment is seen to lie at its heart - those who are economically excluded are, proportionately, more likely to suffer social exclusion. A range of employment-related policies (from offering advice about returning to work - as well as tax credits for childcare - to single parents, to a range of training schemes) are employed (pun intended) in this respect.

Policy in this area also involves regional regeneration initiatives (encouraging employers to relocate to areas of high unemployment, for example) as well as advice on debt management for the short-term unemployed.
AS Sociology For AQA

Education: Qualifications, training and skills - especially those relating to new technologies (computing and information services, for example) are considered a further way to prevent social exclusion by equipping people with the skills needed for work (the connection is frequently made by social democratic writers between low educational achievement, low-paid work or unemployment and social exclusion). The introduction of Educational Maintenance Allowances across the UK in 2004, for example, pays post-16 students up to £30 a week if they stay in full-time education.

Neighbourhood regeneration: Part of the overall solution to poverty involves developing neighbourhood-based communities, which in turn involves policies to regenerate depressed neighbourhoods and create "sustainable communities". This is to be achieved, according to the Social Exclusion Unit, by: “Providing homes for key workers, regenerating towns and cities, providing parks for families and children. Above all it is about helping people to live...with pride in their community”.

Social Democratic Responses: Explanations

As we've suggested, the concept of poverty has been widened in recent years to encompass a broad range of ideas - from social inclusion and exclusion to cycles of deprivation - that suggest "poverty" is something more than just the lack of money. Whether or not this is actually the case is a debateable point - and whether the Third Way idea of "tackling social exclusion" is the same as offering a solution to poverty is also something that's up for discussion. However, we can dig a little deeper into social democratic solutions by questioning two of its basic principles, namely: does social exclusion actually exist and how valid is the concept of a cycle of deprivation? We can start, therefore, by looking at:

Social Exclusion

Many of the problems we've noted with the concepts of an underclass and culture of dependency apply to this idea, so I don't propose to rake over this ground. However, it's worth noting the following:

Measurement: Since social exclusion can't be directly observed, we have to use indicators of exclusion in order to measure it. The problem, however, is a lack of consensus about which indicators to use. Le Grand et al (1999), for example, used five indicators of social exclusion:

- Active engagement in consumption.
- Savings.
- Productive paid work.
- Political attachment / involvement.
- Social interaction.

They found “Less than 1% had been excluded on all five dimensions for at least five years”. However, when considering exclusion in terms of:

Life Chances - both positive (earning a living wage, enjoying good health and so forth) and negative (the chances of being unemployed, going to prison and the like) - Howarth et al (1998), used “Forty-six indicators to show the numbers of people facing difficulties at various points in their lives”. The indicators were grouped in terms of life stages (children, the elderly and so forth) to reflect “…the importance of multiple disadvantage to individuals”.

In recent years at least, this theory has taken on an almost axiomatic status (the notion that something is self-evidently true) but Townsend (1974) has termed this idea a “confused thesis”, in terms of:

Continuity: For Walker (1996): “The central idea was poverty persists because social problems reproduce themselves from one generation to the next”. He notes, however, a massive UK research programme in the 1970’s into a possible cycle of deprivation found “…no simple continuity of social problems between generations”. In addition, the evidence suggests no simple:

Patterns of disadvantage between generations. Rutter and Madge (1976) found “at least half” of children born into a disadvantaged home didn’t display the same levels of deprivation once they reached adulthood - which suggests poverty is not necessarily generational but that forms of disadvantage develop anew with each generation.

In addition, Brown and Madge (1982) found no "inevitable continuity of deprivation" in relation to poverty and the poor.

Module Link

"Dependency culture" is an idea that has gradually passed into the popular (commonsense) consciousness through constant repetition in the media, such that it is increasingly rare to see discussion of the relationship between poverty and the welfare state without the idea of a “dependency culture" being prominently featured as if its existence had been reliably proven rather than simply asserted (as “something everyone knows”). This concept is a good example of the way in which sociological research can shed light on ideas that are often "taken for granted".

Cumulative effects: The basic logic of cycle of deprivation theories is also questionable since, if they exist, effects would have to be cumulative - we would expect, even over a couple of generations, to see an expansion of poverty (think in terms of one set of parents producing 3 children who, in turn produce 3 children...). This simply hasn't happened - which either suggests government interventions to break the cycle of deprivation have been successful or, as both the figures for those in poverty and the available research suggests, such a cycle does not actually exist in any significant form.
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Having examined individual / cultural examples of solutions to poverty, we can move-on to explore a couple of:

Structural responses that, for our purposes, involve examining Marxist and Feminist perspectives.

**Marxist Responses: Observations**

For Marxists there is not so much a “problem of poverty” in our society as, to paraphrase R.H. Tawney (1931) “a problem of wealth”; that is, they view the unequal distribution of wealth as a prime reason for the existence of poverty - whether you define it in absolute or relative terms. In this respect, Marxist analyses of “the problem” focus on:

**Economic inequality**: Capitalist societies are, by definition, unequal societies and the inequality that lies at the heart of this economic system is, as we’ve just noted, the primary cause of poverty. As we’ve seen in earlier sections, even in a society as wealthy as the UK, massive inequalities of income and wealth exist - such that a relatively small number of the very wealthy live in great comfort and luxury while those at the other end of the class scale exist on relatively little.

Economic inequality, for Marxists, is rooted in the relationship between Capital, on the one hand, and Labour on the other - or, to put this another way, the relationship between those who own the means of production (Capitalists) and those who do not. This relationship is fundamentally unequal not simply because owners are able to make profits - by effectively charging more for goods and services than they cost to produce (a production process involving things like wages, raw materials, machine costs and so forth), but because these profits are kept in private hands, rather than being owned by those make the goods and provide the services - the working class.

**Welfarism**: State-sponsored welfare is seen as an attempt to limit the worst excesses of social and economic inequality by giving those at the bottom of society “just enough” to keep them from destitution. Welfare, from this perspective, operates on both an economic level (payments to people who have been ignored or discarded by employers) and a political level - to prevent social unrest and upheaval.

As Sloan (2003) puts it: “The raw effects of capitalist relations in class society have been softened to some extent by the effectiveness of…state welfare systems…as ‘safety nets’ to ensure the basic health and housing of the unemployed…and the unemployable, particularly when the capitalist economic system is undergoing one of its occasional recessions or depressions”. Welfare, therefore, is another form of:

**Social Control**, in a couple of ways. Firstly, it’s a means of “buying-off” discontent with a Capitalist system that condemns large numbers of people to poverty and, secondly, it allows the behaviour of the poor to be policed by the State in the form of social workers (“soft policing”, as it’s sometimes called).

**Marxist Responses: Explanations**

In general terms, the solution to poverty is the replacement of a Capitalist economic system by:

**Communism** - a political and economic system in which the private ownership of property is abolished; everything is held “in common” (owned “by everyone”). The organisation of the workplace along Communist principles effectively removes the relationships (owner-worker, employer - employee) that create economic and social inequality. In other words, Marxists see Capitalist societies as incapable of reform (in terms of either reducing levels of inequality or solving problems of poverty). On the contrary, inequality is built into the economic system and poverty has its social and economic uses for a ruling class.

**Is poverty a problem caused by the wealthy?**

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**Tried and Tested**

(a) Explain the term “privatisation” (2 marks).

(b) Suggest two ways State welfare systems represent a “safety net” (4 marks).

(c) Suggest three ways governments have tried to promote social inclusion over the past decade (6 marks).

(d) Examine sociological criticisms of the concept of social exclusion (24 marks).

(e) Compare New Right and Social Democratic responses to the problem of poverty (24 marks).
Given the above, it makes it difficult to link Marxist perspectives to any particular social policies related to poverty - save, of the course, the most ambitious policy of all - the replacement of one form of society (Capitalism) with another (Communism). Until this should ever happen (and admittedly it’s not looking too likely at the moment...) we can note a range of ideas associated with Marxist responses that look to both expose the ideological nature of “poverty discourses”; in other words, they seek to demonstrate how the existence of poverty is built into the social structure of Capitalist society such that “perpetuating poverty” is actually in the general interests of a ruling class. In this respect, therefore, we can note a number of “beneficial dimensions to poverty” for a ruling class:

- **Economic** Mulvihill and Swaminatha (2006) argue that poverty serves a range of functions that ultimately benefit the “affluent”; these include, for example, “the performance of menial and undesirable jobs” that need to be performed if the economy is to continue to function.

- **Political** An important aspect of poverty is the idea of social exclusion – an idea shared with both New Right and Social Democratic perspectives and one that illustrates the different ways Marxist and New Right perspectives examine and understand poverty. For the New Right social exclusion is the fault of the poor since an Underclass is seen to “exclude itself” from participation in “everyday society” by its behaviour (economic dependence on the State, criminality and so forth). For Marxists, the opposite is true:

- **Ideological** The Individualisation of poverty, Marxists argue, is part of a “softening up” process that both distracts attention away from the idea that “poverty is created by the actions of the rich” (that is, it has structural causes) and focuses on the “inadequacies of the poor” in ways that allow social control agencies to intervene in the lives of the poor (through the police and social workers, for example) in ways that would not be tolerated by the rich and powerful. As Barrett notes “Excluding people by “individualizing” the origins of the causes and of the solutions to poverty and unemployment deflects attention from the laws and corporate decisions that are designed to produce and reproduce the undermining of wages and employment conditions... By engaging in endless discussions of who are the “deserving poor” (the babies of the unemployed or their parents) a politics of self-restraint is encouraged. Perhaps we are overdue for a critical analysis of the creation of profit and wealth among the undeserving rich”.

In a *global context*, women experience different levels of poverty to men, in a number of ways. Sweetman (1998) for example, notes women around the world:

- Have less food and suffer greater levels of malnutrition.
- Are less likely to have paid work.
- Suffer greater ill-health.
- Lack access to education.
- Experience greater levels of homelessness.
- Suffer greater levels of social exclusion.

In a *national context*, it would be useful to understand how ideas about poverty relate to female experiences in the UK, where we know, for example, women:

- Have equal access to education - and out-perform men at just about every level.
- Live longer, on average.
- Are only slightly less likely to have a job than a man.
- Are no more likely to be malnourished or homeless than men.

Rather than talk about the feminisation of poverty, therefore, should we not be examining how poverty is masculinised? The answer (as you probably, deep down, suspected) is “no” - which, given the ideas we’ve just noted, may seem surprising until you recognise that despite these apparent female advantages (or, at the very least, rough equalities with their male counterparts) women in the UK are far more likely to experience high levels of poverty than men.

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(providing, as we’ve noted, a reserve army of labour, for example).
This happens for a number of reasons, not the least of which, according to Mellor (2000) relate to the idea “Women are paying huge prices for being carers as well as breadwinners - lower pay, worse promotion prospects and ultimately poverty in old age because they make less contribution towards pensions”. If women in general are more likely to experience poverty than men, therefore, we need to briefly note how and why this situation occurs:

**Economic Factors**

As we’ve discussed in previous Sections, female participation in the workplace is conditioned by a number of important factors, including:

**Horizontal and vertical segregation** that generally means women occupy lower-paid, lower-status, positions within the workplace - as Ward (2004) has suggested in the following terms:

*The entrenched split between traditionally "male" and "female" careers is just as glaring among today's teenagers as among their older workmates….even those entering the workplace at 16 are choosing occupations along traditional gender lines.*

The continuing trend means “deep-rooted inequalities” in pay and employment prospects are mapped out for young people from the very first day of their working lives…. Even among teenagers in their first jobs, young women earn 16% less than their male counterparts - blowing apart the myth that the effect on women’s careers of having children is the sole cause of pay inequality”.

**Primary** and **secondary labour markets**, where women are over-represented in secondary markets that involve, for example, insecure forms of part-time work. According to the Office for National Statistics (2004), the gender pay gap for full-time workers is 19.5% (female average hourly earnings are approximately 80% of male average hourly earnings) and 40% for part-time workers.

**Gender Pay Gap**

The benefits system in the UK is both complicated and extensive, involving as it does a mix of:

**Universal** payments (such as Child Benefit - paid to all families who qualify as a right).

**Means-tested** payments (such as Housing Benefit), paid to claimants on a sliding scale related to income and savings - the higher these are, the less benefit you receive.

**Retirement / Widowhood**: One consequence of women living longer, coupled with inequalities in welfare and pension arrangements, is the greater likelihood of poverty in old age. The benefits system in the UK is both complicated and extensive, involving as it does a mix of:

**Universal** payments (such as Child Benefit - paid to all families who qualify as a right).

**Means-tested** payments (such as Housing Benefit), paid to claimants on a sliding scale related to income and savings - the higher these are, the less benefit you receive.

Just as men and women experience family life and relationships differently, family arrangements affect the likelihood of greater female poverty in a number of ways:

**Single-parenthood**: Where women are more likely to be single-parents, this increases their chances of experiencing poverty because of the problems involved in juggling childcare responsibilities and paid work. One consequence of this is involvement in:

**Homeworking**: Both Oxfam (2003) and the Equal Opportunities Commission (2003a) note, for example, “British women homeworkers are paid, on average, £2.53 per hour, receive no sick, holiday, or maternity pay, are made redundant without notice or compensation, are not subject to adequate health and safety checks [and] lose their jobs if they dare to claim the rights enjoyed by others”.

**Family Life**

The reality less so...

The image is alluring...

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The reality less so...
Insurance-based payments (such as the Job Seeker’s Allowance - pre-1996 this was called Unemployment Benefit). Receipt is based on the individual having paid National Insurance contributions for a specific qualifying period. This situation creates problems for women, in particular, because of the impact of their:

Dual role as both unpaid domestic workers and paid employees; in basic terms, female qualification for insurance-based payments is reduced, according to Bradshaw et al (2003) through: “A broken employment history because of child rearing and high rates of part-time work”. Where benefits are means-tested (and assuming both a male and female in the household) Bradshaw et al note how ‘Women’s poverty can be hidden by unequal income distribution within the household. When resources are tight, women are more likely than men to go without. Women tend to manage money when it is in short supply and there is debt, carrying the stressful burden of budgeting’.

A further aspect of poverty here is how it “restricts social activity, causes stress in relationships and becomes a dominant feature of everyday life.”. As Bradshaw et al argue: “There is some evidence that social isolation and depression are felt especially by young women, and that women and men may experience poverty in different ways”.

Female poverty in old age (roughly 60% of pensioners are women) is also related to many of the above factors; a broken work record, for example, coupled with child care responsibilities makes it harder for women to make sufficient employment-related pension payments to receive a full pension - on average, female pensioners have only 50% of male retirement income.

In terms of social policy, we can note a number of possible solutions to female poverty, in four main areas:

**Work:** The Trades Union Congress Women’s Conference (2003) has suggested social policy changes to benefit women should include:

- Raising the national minimum wage.
- Setting government-backed and enforced targets for raising female incomes.

As Mellor (2003) argues “The Equal Pay Act has not brought about equal pay... If you take any of the lowest paid work – cleaning, catering, home care – you will find jobs done mainly by women. You will find women who juggle two or three of these jobs at a time, because one alone wouldn’t pay enough to live on. You will find women scraping together a living for themselves and their families”.

- Setting targets for closing the gender pay gap (for both full time and part time workers).
- The provision of affordable childcare and an increased level of childcare tax credits.

**Family Life** policies to reduce or solve female poverty suggested by the TUC Women’s Conference Report (2003) include:

- Child Support payment increases (from non-resident parents).
- Paid carer leave from work.
- Earnings-related maternity pay.
- Increased Carer’s Allowance.
- More government funding for local authority care services.
- Tax and pension credits “for those out of paid employment for parenting or family care reasons”.

**Education:** Men and women still choose different work and career paths in our society which, in some respects, may be related to gender stereotyping in schools (when, given the choice, males and females study different subjects and are encouraged, through careers services for example, to pursue - or not as the case may be - different occupational paths and strategies). Social policy in this area, therefore, should be directed at ending this type of gendered curriculum.

**Welfare:** A range of policies could be implemented to significantly reduce disadvantages faced by women. Extending and increasing State pension payments and linking increases to average earnings (rather than average price increases - the latter tend to rise more slowly) would be one way of raising many women (and men, come to that) out of old age poverty. In addition, work-related State benefits need to be made available “as retirement approaches without jeopardising retirement benefits”.

- Employer pension schemes need to include part-time workers.
- Flexible part-time working needs to be made available as retirement approaches without jeopardising retirement benefits.
- Pension entitlement should be extended to more working women.

The Equal Opportunities Commission (2003) has argued policy work needs to be done to prevent women falling into poverty in old age by recognising different male and female working patterns. In particular:

(a) Explain the term “feminisation of poverty” (2 marks).

(b) Suggest two ways that poverty is a “problem of the wealthy” (4 marks).

(c) Suggest three reasons for female poverty (6 marks).

(d) Examine the view that poverty can be “beneficial to a ruling class” (24 marks).

(e) Assess the view that responses to poverty should focus on structural, not individual, reform (24 marks).


Bradshaw, Jonathan; Finch, Naomi; Kemp, Peter; Mayhew, Emese and Williams, Julie (2003) “Gender and poverty in Britain”: Equal Opportunities Commission


Equal Opportunities Commission (2003a) “EOC calls for an end to poverty pay for homeworkers”: EOC.


Newling, Dan and Bates, Daniel (2007) “Jobless couple with 12 children are given a £500,000 home”: Daily Mail, 24th July.


Social Exclusion Unit (2000) “Cycle of Repeated Anti-social Behaviour”: Social Exclusion Unit


When we think about the provision of welfare services in our society (as most of us probably do in those idle moments when there’s nothing much on TV), we tend to think about the Welfare State and the range of services it provides - from doctors and hospitals, through education to pensions. Welfare provision, however, is not simply a matter of government services - it is, as you’ll no doubt be disappointed to learn, a little more complicated than that - which is why the general focus of this section is the nature and role of public, private, voluntary and informal welfare provision.

Before we start to examine these types of provision, however, we need to clarify a few ideas:

Welfare: This idea, considered in terms of its widest definition, simply involves the idea of help being given to someone who needs it. If I’m “looking out for your welfare”, it means I care about you, am considerate of your needs and will help you to overcome problems in your life (I’m not, by the way - this is just an example that makes me look good). We need to keep this definition in mind, since it means the concept of welfare provision potentially has many forms, the most obvious of which, perhaps, is:

• Public welfare that, for our purposes at least, refers to services and benefits provided by the State and generally funded through some form of direct or indirect taxation. Although the provision of public welfare - in some shape or form - has a relatively long history in Britain (the “Ordinance of Labourers” in 1349, for example, was designed to stop people giving relief to “able-bodied beggars”, the idea being to make them work for a living - some ideas, if seems, never change), our main focus will be on the creation and development of the Welfare State, post-1945.

• Private welfare generally refers to the role of private companies in the provision of a range of personal and public services. This includes both companies who expressly exist to provide such services and also companies who provide welfare benefits to their workforce (such as a pension scheme) as part of their employment contract.

Voluntary provision, on the other hand, relates to services provided by a range of groups and individuals (charities and self-help groups, for example) independently of State provision - although, as we will see, the activities of such groups may be regulated and coordinated, on a local and national level, by the government.

As you might expect, voluntary provision of welfare by charitable and religious groups has a long history in our society.

Informal welfare: The final form of welfare, whose significance should not be overlooked or underestimated, is that provided by people such as family and friends - a potentially important source of welfare throughout peoples’ lives. This type of provision is informal because there’s no guarantee it will be offered when needed.

Radio Fab FM DJ’s Mike “Smashie” Smash and Dave “Nicey” Nice - two guys who do one Helluva lot of voluntary charidy work (not that
Public welfare: The concept of a Welfare State in Britain is something we tend to associate with developments during and immediately after the 2nd world war; while these are clearly very important (they formed the basis for State welfare provision that’s still going strong 50 years later) some forms of State-sponsored welfare provision existed prior to this. In the early part of the last century, for example, old age pensions were introduced (however, given it was paid at age 70 - when average life expectancy for working class men was around 45 years - this didn’t greatly benefit the poor); a rudimentary health service and unemployment benefit system also existed at this time.

The above notwithstanding, the focus here is on post-war developments, mainly because this period represents the most coherent attempt to develop a universal system of State welfare. In many ways, the nature, purpose and role of public welfare has changed over the past 50 years, reflecting a movement away from a simple government concern with the relief of poverty and the improvement of general living standards to thinking about how some, relatively poor, groups in society are socially excluded (and, by extension, how government action can lead to their social inclusion). We need, therefore, to understand welfare changes in:

Ideological terms - how ideas about the nature and purpose of public welfare have changed, as well as:

Welfare Provision: Observations

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<td>Butler Education Act (1944)</td>
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<td>Want</td>
<td>Family Allowance Act (1945)</td>
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<td>Disease</td>
<td>National Health Act (1948)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Squalor</td>
<td>Building of good-quality, low-rent, “Council” housing in 1950s</td>
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Political terms - how different political groups, for example, have attempted to stamp their ideas on welfare provision and, of course,

Economic terms - since, in many ways, questions of cost and affordability (a word we’ve probably just made up) have influenced the nature, extent and type of public provision available.

We can track this sense of change in the nature of welfare provision (and, as we will see, the role of government) by thinking, initially, about the nature and purpose of the:

Welfare State, which developed in a social context very different to our present-day society. The ideas forming the basis for the Welfare State (brought together in the so-called Beveridge Report, 1942) developed against a background of war and environmental destruction as well as severe social and economic privation (hardship). The nature of welfare provision, in such a situation, focused on what Beveridge considered to be the “Five Giants” that needed to be conquered “on the road to reconstruction”.

The idea of “Five Giants” tells us something important about both the thinking behind the creation of a Welfare State and the nature of the welfare it was designed to provide - this was a society in which major social problems existed and, as such, required major, State-led, changes to the way welfare was provided.

The Welfare State reflected an important social democratic consensus about the desirability of both a national system of welfare provision (based on the principle of need rather than the ability to pay) and the way it should be funded - through a general taxation system which meant services were “free at the point of contact”.

One of the interesting features of the post-war welfare consensus was the ambitious nature of the overall project - it aimed to provide a comprehensive system of:

Health care, through a National Health Service integrating General Practitioners (neighbourhood doctor’s surgeries) with hospital services.

Through the 1980’s and early 1990’s Conservative politicians like Margaret Thatcher and Norman Tebbit forced a radical rethink of State welfare systems in the UK.
Housing: Through a system of Local Authority ("Council") housing designed to provide relatively cheap but good quality rented accommodation for those most in need.

Education: Compulsory and free education was introduced for all children between the ages of 5 and 15, via a “Tri-partite system” of grammar, secondary modern and technical schools (a system explained in more detail in the Education chapter).

Insurance: A number of different forms of (compulsory) social insurance were introduced for groups such as the unemployed and the elderly, funded through a National Insurance levy on wages. Other forms of benefits were also made available for those without the required employment history to qualify for insurance payments.

With the exception of public housing, these general forms of State welfare provision have remained in place to the present day; however, there have been a number of changes in the way State-based welfare has been provided - and related debates about how it can and should be funded.

In the 1980’s, for example, a radical shift in thinking about public welfare provision developed around three main factors:

1. Ideology: The rise of New Right ideas (initially in America and more gradually in the UK) prompted a reassessment of the nature and role of welfare provision. From a libertarian, New Right perspective, for example Ashford (1993) identified 6 reasons for arguing against public welfare:

   - **Immorality**: Income is “forcibly redistributed from taxpayers to those who are believed to deserve it by politicians”.
   - **Freedom of Choice**: Free, universal provision makes it more difficult for other alternatives (such as private health care) to compete with State provision.
   - **Welfare Dependency**: The creation of “a class...permanently dependent on the state for all their major decisions” (an idea we’ve examined in some detail in relation to New Right concepts of an underclass and dependency culture).
   - **Ineffective**: State welfare systems rarely achieve the goals they are set and rarely benefit those most in need. “The middle classes”, for example, “are the disproportionate beneficiaries of the nationalised health system”.
   - **Producer capture**: Involves the consumer lacking choice over welfare provision. “In a monopoly situation the service is provided in the interests of the producer” and, consequently, provides no consumer checks-and-balances on the quality of the service provided - you can’t, for example, easily change your doctor if you don’t like the service they provide.
   - **Inefficient**: Private welfare provision, selectively targeted at those in most need, can provide welfare services more cheaply and more responsively to the needs of the consumer.

2. Politics: Between 1979 and 1997, successive Conservative governments (under first Margaret Thatcher and then John Major) introduced a number of general changes to public welfare provision based, in part, on the general ideological principles just outlined. In particular, a system of:
Internal markets, designed to “promote competition and increase effectiveness and efficiency” within the Welfare State was developed. The National Health Service, for example, saw competition between different hospitals and departments for the treatment of patients.

Privatisation policies were also pursued, whereby State-owned assets (such as British Gas and British Telecom) were sold to private shareholders. Privatisation extended directly into the welfare sphere through Council house tenants being given the “Right To Buy” their home at a market discount depending on a range of qualifying factors (such as having lived in the house for at least two years).

A further aspect of privatisation involved explicit government encouragement of private pensions (through media advertising. For example); the basic idea behind this was that people should save for their retirement throughout their working lifetime. Increased income in old age, it was believed, would lead to lower levels of elderly poverty. However, a major problem with this idea was the mis-selling of private pensions by insurance companies...

The influence of these ideas has, it could be argued, led to a change in the nature of welfare provision and a reassessment of the role played by government. We can see this most noticeably in the changes introduced by:

New Labour governments (from 1997 onward). They continued the reform of public welfare provision begun under previous governments, partly, as Wrigley argues, because of a commitment to keep to previous financial spending targets and partly because of an ideological change in perceptions of the nature and role of public welfare. Oppenheim (1998), for example, argues the key elements of the New Labour approach to public welfare were:

Reciprocity - the idea welfare provision should be based on a system of “rights and responsibilities”. Many original aspects of the Welfare State were based on this idea (individuals make national insurance contributions, for example, in order to receive benefits if and when they’re needed). New Labour took this idea further, however, in a couple of ways:

Policies - such as the Child Support Agency (originally created by the Conservative government in 1993 and substantially reformed by New Labour), designed to promote “individual responsibility” for family welfare. The Child Support Agency targeted single-parent families by requiring an “absent parent” (one living apart from their partner) to contribute to the financial upkeep of their children.

Participation: One aspect of the changing role of welfare provision (over the past 5 or so years) has been...
A desire to move away from a rigid, bureaucratic, professionally-administered system to one where the consumers of welfare (or “clients” as they’re sometimes called) have greater involvement in the delivery of welfare (rather than simply being recipients of State aid). This has resulted in the development of a number of initiatives for delivering welfare and, by extension, a change in the relationship between public, private, voluntary and informal welfare providers.

Although we’ll explore this idea in more detail in a moment, we can note for the moment how the State has developed a:

Coordination role in the delivery of welfare. In other words, although government is still involved in welfare as a primary provider, its role has been modified to accommodate, sponsor and co-ordinate the activities of a variety of private, voluntary and informal groups. Craig et al (1999), for example, studied the development of “national compacts” involving “joint working between government and the voluntary and community sectors” in areas such as:

- Health Action Zones - partnerships between the NHS, local authorities, community groups and the voluntary and business sectors.
- The New Deal for Communities - partnerships to tackle the problems of “poor job prospects; high levels of crime; educational under-achievement; poor health and problems with housing and the physical environment”.
- Sure Start - designed to deliver programmes related to “early education, childcare, health and family support”.

A key element in the New Labour welfare strategy is to make a distinction between poverty (in the sense of economic hardship) and social exclusion (in the sense of social - but not necessarily economic - inequality). The original focus of the Welfare State was the former; the new focus of welfare is the latter - and one way to promote social inclusion is through work (at least it is from a social democratic perspective).

To this end, various programmes have been developed with the aim of getting people (from the unemployed, through single-parents to the differently-abled) into some form of work (such as job creation schemes, the introduction of flexible working rules and so forth). An example of this type of thinking about the nature and role of welfare was the introduction of a:

Minimum wage, designed to increase the income differential between those in work and those out of work. This may, at first site, seem an odd way of tackling poverty, until you realise it’s designed to tackle exclusion - a subtle, but important, difference. The thinking here, therefore, was that by increasing the income differential (by forcing all employers to pay a minimum level of wages) the option of work would become more attractive to those living on welfare payments. They would, therefore, be taken out of a “culture of dependency” (an idea, you will remember - or not as the case may be - that’s central to both New Right and Social Democratic views on poverty and exclusion) and re-integrated into mainstream society.

We’ll look in more detail in a moment at what all this means for the (changing) role of welfare provision in our society, but next we need to examine some aspects of:

Iain Duncan Smith (2007), the ex-leader of the Conservative Party, updated Beveridge’s “Five Giants” to identify “Five Modern Giants” facing contemporary British society...
As the name suggests, private welfare provision involves profit-making individuals and companies providing welfare services. This may involve things like:

- **Fees** - money paid directly to a company for a specific service (such as buying a place at an Independent (Public) school, a private consultation with a doctor, a hospital operation and so forth) and:

- **Insurance** - which involves things like paying money regularly into a fund (such as a private pension, for example) or buying a particular policy to cover a possible eventuality (such as the risk of falling ill and being unable to work). It is, of course, possible to take out insurance that, eventually, will be used to pay something like school fees.

There is, however, a further development we could note here, namely the increasing involvement of private companies in the:

**Welfare infrastructure**: That is, although private companies may not be directly involved in the provision of services (such as hospital treatment) they may have built (and technically own) the hospital in which the treatment takes place - which they then *lease* to the government. Private developers, according to the University of Ulster Centre for Property and Planning (1998), are also extensively involved in “urban regeneration” schemes on a similar basis.

As **Burchardt** (1999) points out, “Welfare has never been the exclusive preserve of the state”. This was as true before the development of the Welfare State (most doctors, for example, charged fees for consultations) as it is today - you can, for example, buy private medical treatment and care if you can afford it. The main question here, however, is not so much the nature of private welfare provision (as indicated above), but more the changing role of private providers and, as a consequence, the changing role of public providers.

Although, as we will see, the public-private welfare provision relationship is becoming increasingly complex, we also need to consider a further aspect of this relationship, namely the role played by:

**Voluntary Organisations**

In general terms, we can characterise this type of welfare provider as:

**Non-profit-making**: This may involve the provision of free services or the charging of (small) fees to cover the actual cost of welfare provision.

**Voluntary**: An obvious point to make, perhaps, but the activities of many of these organisations are highly dependent on volunteer help - whether in terms of things like collecting money for charity or working in a community with disadvantaged individuals and groups.
Having said this, one notable feature of voluntary organisations in the UK is their:

**Diversity:** Voluntary organisations actually take a number of different forms, ranging in size from large, national (and international) organisations (charities such as Oxfam, with an income of £188 million in 2002), to smaller, locally-based, community groups (Cardiff Action for Single Homeless, for example, with an income of £1.1 million in 2003) or even small voluntary associations based at neighbourhood level.

Although, traditionally, voluntary organisations have worked independently of government, this situation is increasingly changing as they become further integrated into the changing nature of welfare provision in the UK. This, in turn, perhaps, indicates something of a changing role for such groups - especially where they are funded - but not directly controlled - by the State and where their basic organisation and composition is regulated through government departments. The process of integration has not, however, necessarily been simple or smooth.

**Kumar and Nunan** (2002) have suggested the integration of community-based groups, for example, into the overall welfare system has been hindered by “...confusion and contradictions over their support arrangements and the way they are governed” - especially in terms of “unsuitable legal frameworks and poor, inappropriate constitutions”.

Despite problems of integration, voluntary organisations have an important role to play in a welfare system that, although largely centrally funded and directed, is increasingly localised in terms of where and how some forms of welfare are delivered - especially those that focus on policies for social inclusion.

In some respects, the distinction between voluntary groups and informal types of care (see below) is becomingly blurred “at the margins”; for example, the development of “self-help” groups (characterised by **Wilson** (1994) as “…groups run by and for people who share a common problem or experience”) involves a relatively informal system of help and care within communities, neighbourhoods and even families - an idea we can explore further when we examine:

This type of care has, traditionally, been provided by and within family and friendship groups (mainly, it needs to be noted, by women). General features of this type of provision include the idea it is:

**Unstructured** (in the sense of not being formally organised).

**Free** (provided at little or no cost to the government).

**Affective** - people provide care for the elderly, sick, differently-abled and so forth because they feel love, affection and responsibility for their welfare. **Beresford** (1994), for example, noted “The pleasure and satisfaction gained through the relationship with the disabled child was the fundamental reason why parents felt able to continue to care for their child...[even though] the stresses associated with the care of their disabled child to be wide-ranging, unrelenting and sometimes overwhelming”.

Although, as we’ve suggested, informal types of care are both traditional and, probably, the oldest form of welfare provision in our society, the recently developed welfare focus on inclusion and exclusion has tended to draw some forms of informal care into the general welfare net, leading to a distinct change in the role - if not necessarily the nature - of such care. For example, we can note the concept of:

**Care in the Community** - the idea that, rather than incarcerate (“lock-up”) the mentally ill in large, impersonal, institutions, their welfare would, it was argued, be increased if they were cared for within the community - which, in effect, meant within the family group.

Is “Care in the Community” just another way of saying “Care by women in the home” (but with few, if any, resources)?

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**The Pret Foundation Trust**
Source: [http://www.pret.com](http://www.pret.com)

“Julian Metcalfe and Sinclair Becham (the founders of Pret A Manger) set up The Pret Foundation Trust in 1995. The Trust is funded by money that we donate from the sales of some of our products (Lemon-Aid, Dolphin-Friendly Tuna Baguette and our Christmas sandwiches), and customer donations through collection boxes in shops. This primarily supports the Pret Charity Run, a fleet of electric vans, which collect and distribute our leftover food at the end of every day to charities for the homeless across London.”

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The Community Care Act (1990), for example, created a system of patient assessment, community care and progress reviews for mentally ill individuals who were professionally assessed as posing little or no risk to the community.

In some respects, therefore, informal types of care have become part of the general, formalised, system of welfare in the UK - whether this involves family members receiving government allowances as “carers” or the integration of a variety of self-help groups into community regeneration projects. However, although informal caring has certain advantages, which include things like:

- **Local** delivery.
- **Responsiveness** to individual needs
- **Personal** experiences of carers of the problems they are helping to resolve,

it also has some significant disadvantages, such as:

- **Patriarchy**: Feminists have generally pointed to the patriarchal assumptions underlying the establishment of the Welfare State (men as the breadwinners and women the homemakers - assumptions, as we’ve seen, that have resulted in women being in a weaker position to claim insurance-based benefits in the past), but increasingly this criticism has been applied to government involvement in informal care where, as we’ve noted, family care (a type of emotional, as well as physical, labour) very often means “care by women”.

- **Resources**: Delivery of informal care is frequently provided “by the poor, for the poor” - in effect, some aspects of the burden of welfare are shifted from government responsibility to family responsibility without a consequent redistribution of resources.

In the previous section we’ve looked at both the changing nature of welfare provision in our society and, to a slightly lesser degree, the changing role of welfare providers. In this respect, when we think about the provision of welfare benefits and services in 21st century Britain, they involve a complex interplay of two main areas:

1. **Between** different types of provider (public and private, voluntary and informal).

2. **Within** different types of provision: Government, for example, is not simply a provider of benefits and services, but also a purchaser of services from private, voluntary and informal providers.

The following table identifies some characteristics of the range of welfare interconnections in our society:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provider</th>
<th>Example Provision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Publicly funded and administered</td>
<td>Unemployment benefit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publicly funded privately administered</td>
<td>Some operations on the NHS are carried out in private hospitals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publicly funded and administered by voluntary groups</td>
<td>Taylor et al (1994) note the way responsibility for community care has been increasingly transferred to both private and voluntary organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privately funded and publicly administered</td>
<td>Some aspects of the welfare infrastructure - such as school and hospital building - are privately funded but managed within the State system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Privately funded and privately administered</td>
<td>Private hospitals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To put the idea of welfare provision into some sort of overall context, therefore, we can note it involves the idea of:

**Welfare Pluralism**

This concept involves the idea of welfare being provided by a number of different groups and institutions. Pluralism, of course, is not a new idea; as we’ve seen, even before the creation of the Welfare State a variety of different formal and informal welfare providers existed.

However, Burchardt (1999) suggests, welfare pluralism can be theorised in a couple of different ways, in terms of, for example:

A **one-dimensional model**, where “welfare can be divided into a dominant and monolithic state sector with a residual ‘private’ category including anything that is not directly provided by the state or is not tax-funded”.

A **two-dimensional model** which “allows for state purchases of private services, and private purchases of public services, as well as the more traditional all-public and all-private sectors”.

She also, however, notes a possible **third dimension** to the public-private relationship, namely:

**Decision-making** on the part of consumers. This involves the idea publicly funded welfare is provided by a range of private producers from which the consumer then chooses. Although this type of decision-making relationship has rarely been explored in the UK, one example was the introduction of a:

**Voucher system** for the purchase of nursery care: Introduced in 1996 / 97 (by the then Conservative government - it was subsequently scrapped by the incoming Labour government), government funds (in the form of a voucher) could be used by parents to purchase childcare from private providers.

Within the context of welfare pluralism, we can also note the changing nature of welfare delivery. In terms of:

**Public welfare**, for example, we can identify three basic modes of delivery for services and benefits:

1. **Universal** forms of delivery are based on the idea everyone in a given population has access to welfare benefits - whether they need them or not at any given time. Within this category we could note such things as the National Health Service as being “universally delivered”. In terms of economic benefits, however, there are few forms of universal provision - Child Benefit (paid to parents with children, regardless of their income level) being a notable exception.

2. **Selective** forms of delivery, on the other hand, can be considered in terms of their targeting at specific groups, rather than the whole population. The selection process to decide eligibility is usually based on **means testing**; for example, if your income is below a certain specified level you receive the benefit or service (Higher Education tuition fees, for example, are based around a means test of eligibility).

3. **Insurance-based** benefits and services are based around the idea certain forms of risk (such as unemployment or old age) are effectively pooled, in the sense people pay a proportion of their income to the government (through National Insurance contributions, for example) and receive benefits as and when (or if) they need them.

Depending on the precise relationship between these different types of delivery model, we can characterise the role of welfare systems (and, by extension, the role of welfare providers) as relating to what Harris (1998) identifies as the “Two chief models of welfare systems”. In idealised terms, these involve:

**Residual Models**

based on ideas relating to:

**Absolute poverty**: Welfare provision is aimed at those who live beneath a specified poverty line, usually - but not necessarily - defined in terms of minimal biological and cultural needs.

**Selectivity**: Help, where it is provided by the State, for example, is targeted specifically at those considered to be in absolute poverty.

**Safety net**: Welfare is seen to provide a way of ensuring the very poorest in society do not fall below a minimum standard of living for the society in which they live.

**Objectives**: The main objective of welfare is to help people to eventually provide for themselves and their families through, for example, work.

**Providers**: Although, within this type of model, the State has some role to play in welfare provision, the main providers are normally voluntary organisations (such as charities) and private welfare agencies (which means individual welfare provision tends to be largely insurance-based; individuals buy private insurance against illness, unemployment and so forth).

**Relative poverty**: Welfare provision is aimed at those who live below an average level of living standards. These people, depending on the society in which they live, may not be considered destitute; rather, they are probably best viewed as being relatively deprived when compared to “normal and expected” standards of living in their society.

**Universality**: The focus of welfare provision is less on individual cases, as such, and more on the desire to ensure general levels of living standards for the majority of a population. Welfare, in this respect, is viewed in terms of social,
rather than specifically individual, needs. A National Health Service, for example, has general social benefits because it prevents the spread of disease by ensuring those who are ill receive treatment, regardless of their ability to pay for it.

**Redistributive:** Universal forms of provision are normally funded through general taxation, progressively levied on the individual’s ability to pay. In the UK, for example, the greater your income, the more income tax you pay (at least in theory – the rich tend to develop ways of minimising the amount of tax they actually pay as, in some instances, do the very poor when they work “cash-in-hand” for example).

**Objectives** for this type of system vary. In the UK in the 21st century, for example, the State is faced with markedly different problems to solve than those faced at the end of the 20th world war – then, the problems were ones of economic and environmental reconstruction, the relief of absolute poverty and so forth. Now, problems are essentially two-pronged:

Although poverty relief is still important, living standards have risen; this has tended to change the welfare focus to that of social inequality – as poverty has declined, for example, inequality has increased.

Secondly, problems of social inclusion and integration are increasingly significant now (when they weren’t in 1950’s). The impact of economic globalisation, the problem of fragmenting social relationships, a greater sense of individual identities and needs, combined with the rise of New Right welfare ideologies and so forth have created problems of social inclusion and exclusion that, arguably, have to be solved by the State.

**Providers:** In general, the State is seen as the one institution in society with the power and capability to both provide universal forms of welfare and to co-ordinate the welfare efforts of a variety of different providers.

**Tried and Tested**

(a) Identify one example of publicly funded and administered welfare other than unemployment benefit (2 marks).

(b) Suggest two possible advantages for universal forms of welfare delivery (4 marks).

(c) Suggest two possible advantages for selective welfare delivery (4 marks).

(d) Examine the argument that universal forms of welfare delivery are superior to other possible forms in targeting poverty” (24 marks).

(e) Compare institutional and relative models of welfare (24 marks).


Centre for Property and Planning (1998) “Accessing private finance: the availability and effectiveness of private finance in urban regeneration”: University of Ulster


Niyazi, Filiz (1996) “A Route to Opportunity - Younger People; Older People; Unemployed People; Black People and Disabled People”: National Centre for Volunteering.


References